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Articles
Delineating the Terms of a Single Composite 
Transaction in Transfer Pricing: The Role of 
Step-Transaction Analysis in the Aggregation 
of Interrelated (Linked) Contracts
This art icle provides guidance on the task of 
aggregation and disaggregation of contract 
terms in transfer pricing. It  explains that: (1) 
aggregation involves giving expression to 
the part ies’ single composite transaction; (2) 
aggregation requires applying a step-transaction 
analysis, which makes it  possible to delineate 
the true substance of the composite transaction, 
and then apply the relevant tax rule(s) based 
on the combined effect of the interrelated 
contracts; and (3) disaggregation may be used 
as an anti-avoidance measure. The art icle also 
identifies notable implicat ions of aggregation.
1.  Aggregation of Contracts in Transfer Pricing: 
The Need for Clarity
For the purpose of conducting a transfer pricing arm’ s 
length comparability analysis,1 the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Admin-
istrations (OECD Guidelines)2 recognize the possible need 
to aggregate separately executed but interrelated (linked) 
transactions. Following the OECD’ s recommendations, 
in the GlaxoSmithKline Inc. case3 the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that a linked transaction may need to be 
“taken into account” as a relevant circumstance.4 Unfor-
tunately, the Court failed to elaborate on, or clarify as to 
how, linked transactions are to be taken into account. 
What does the task of aggregation require? Arguably, the 
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1. The author assumes that at least some of the readers of this article will 
require and benefit from an introductory overview of the topic of trans-
fer pricing. For this purpose, Appendix 1 (section 9.1.) explains the prob-
lems which transfer pricing law attempts to address, the causes of those 
problems, and the internationally coordinated approach to address these 
problems.
2. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (OECD 2010), para. 3.4, International Organizations’ 
Documentation IBFD.
3. The case was first decided by the Tax Court of Canada (TCC) (CA: TC, 
30 May 2008, GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. The Queen, 2008 TCC 324, Tax 
Treaty Case Law IBFD). The case was then appealed by the taxpayer to 
the Federal Court of Appeal (CA: FCA, 26 July 2010, GlaxoSmithKline Inc. 
v. The Queen, 2010 FCA 201, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD), and the Min-
ister consequently made a final appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC) (CA: SC, 18 Oct. 2012, GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. The Queen, 2012 
SCC 52, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD).
4. Glaxo (SCC), paras. 15, 38, 41.
OECD guidance on this issue is also insufficient. Con-
sidering the significant role and potential implications of 
aggregation, this need for clarity ought to be addressed.
This article aims to fill this gap by explaining the role of 
aggregation in the comparability analysis; identifying 
notable implications of aggregation; and providing further 
necessary guidance and clarification on this task of aggre-
gation.
2.  Delineating the Terms of the Actual 
Controlled Transaction
2.1.  Arm’ s length comparability analysis: An overview
According to the OECD Guidelines and the US Treasury 
Regulations (US Regulations) under section 482 of the 
Internal Revenue Code,5 a transfer pricing comparability 
analysis begins by delineating the actual controlled trans-
action. It is necessary to determine whether these com-
mercial or financial relations were carried out under con-
ditions (i.e. special non-arm’ s length conditions) which 
are different from those that would have been agreed to 
in a comparable uncontrolled transaction under compar-
able circumstances. If a comparable reveals that the special 
non-arm’ s length conditions would not have been agreed, 
it is necessary to determine the contracting parties’ income 
allocation based on the conditions that would have been 
agreed by arm’ s length parties – namely the income allo-
cation that would have resulted in the comparable uncon-
trolled transaction. Income allocation in the uncontrolled 
transaction would be determined by applying an appro-
priate valuation method, which may be one of the trans-
actional6 or non-transactional7 methods specified in the 
OECD Guidelines or US Regulations, or some other 
unspecified method, so long as it is consistent with the 
arm’ s length standard.8 The methodology ought to reveal 
5. US: 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.482-1, Treasury Regulations sec. 1.482-1.
6. Transactional methods (OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at part II) 
include the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) (OECD Guide-
lines (2010), supra n. 2, at 24, 63-64; US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-3(b)); resale 
price method (OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at 28, 65-70; US Treas. 
Reg. sec. 1.482-3(c)); and cost-plus method (OECD Guidelines (2010), 
supra n. 2, at 26, 70-75; US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-3(d)).
7. Non-transactional methods (OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at 
part III) include the transactional net margin method (TNMM) (OECD 
Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at 30, 77-92) and the transactional profit 
split method (OECD Guidelines (2010), at 28, 93-105; US Treas. Reg. sec. 
1.482-6).
8. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 2.9; US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-
3(e), sec. 1.482-4(d).
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a price or “profit margin”, within an acceptable range9 of 
figures, which represents an arm’ s length income alloca-
tion result.
Having identified the arm’ s length result, it then becomes 
possible to compare it to the income allocation in the con-
trolled transaction. Tax authorities ought to respect the 
transfer price if the arm’ s length result is consistent with 
the income allocation chosen by the associated enterprises 
in the controlled transaction. If the result is inconsistent, 
however, tax authorities may adjust the amount of allo-
cation in the controlled transaction to reflect the arm’ s 
length result.
When a tax authority increases a taxpayer’ s taxable profits as 
a result of applying the arm’ s length principle to the taxpayer’ s 
transactions with its related party in another jurisdiction, double 
taxation arises if the same profits have been or will be included in 
the tax base of the related party. To eliminate the double taxation, 
the tax authority in the other jurisdiction may agree to reduce the 
taxable profits of that related party. Such a downward adjustment 
to the related party’ s taxable profit is known as corresponding 
adjustment.10
However, there is risk that “if the other jurisdiction does 
not agree to make a corresponding adjustment the mul-
tinational enterprise (MNE) group will be taxed twice on 
this part of its profits”.11 To prevent double taxation, the 
taxpayer could challenge the transfer pricing adjustment 
by taking legal action within the jurisdiction where the 
adjustment was made. Additionally, it could request the 
tax authorities to resolve double taxation through a mutual 
agreement procedure (a procedure used to resolve disputes 
involving the application of tax treaties).12
2.2.  The need to delineate the actual controlled 
transaction as it was structured by the parities
Tax is applied on the effects produced by (a) contract(s).13 
A determination of the effect(s) of a contract ought to be 
based on the true (actual) nature of the contract being 
assessed.14 Accordingly, similar to courts in other coun-
9. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at 123-125.
10. SG: Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(IRAS e-Tax Guide, 3rd ed., 2016), para. 3.9. The OECD defines a corres-
ponding adjustment as “an adjustment to the tax liability of the associated 
enterprise in a second tax jurisdiction made by the tax administration of 
that jurisdiction, corresponding to a primary adjustment made by the tax 
administration in a first tax jurisdiction, so that the allocation of profits 
by the two jurisdictions is consistent” (OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 
2, at 25).
11. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at Preface, para. 12.
12. Id., at 139; OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Con-
densed Version 2014 (OECD 2014), art. 25, Models IBFD.
13. CA: TC, 4 Sept. 2007, Richmond (City) v. The Queen, 2007 TCC 336, para. 
33; CA: FCTD, 1974, The Queen v. Lagueux & Frères Inc., 74 DTC 6569, 
at 6572. As Allard explains, “[t]he courts have always held that tax law is 
accessory to private law; it merely specifies the tax consequences of con-
tractual relationships between parties, which are governed by private law 
[…]” (M.-P. Allard, The Retroactive Effect of Conditional Obligations in Tax 
Law, 49 Can. Tax J. 6 (2001), at 1728). 
14. As explained by the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Teck Cominco 
Metals Ltd., “a tax cannot be based on a semantic construction. It must be 
based on the true nature of the transaction” (CA: BCSC, 27 June 2011, Teck 
Cominco Metals Ltd. v. HMTQ, 2011 BCSC839, para. 67). Similarly, the 
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that “the taxability 
of a transaction is determined by its true nature […]” (US: CA (4th Cir.), 
West Virginia Northern Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 63, 65 (4th 
Cir. 1960)). Accordingly, in Universal Drilling Co., it was explained that 
“all of the various aspects of the arrangement must be examined to form 
tries, the US Supreme Court has acknowledged that there 
is a well “established tax principle that a transaction is to be 
given its tax effect in accord with what actually occurred 
and not in accord with what might have occurred”.15
Not surprisingly, this as-structured principle is also inher-
ent in article 9(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
(OECD Model), which requires that the arm’ s length 
comparability analysis be based on the “commercial and 
financial relations” of the actual parties that entered into 
the controlled transaction under review.16 Similarly, the 
OECD Guidelines recommend that “every effort should 
be made to determine the actual nature of the transaction 
and apply arm’ s length pricing to the accurately delineated 
transaction”.17 “A tax administration should not disregard 
the actual transaction or substitute other transactions for 
it unless the exceptional circumstances described in […] 
paragraphs 1.122-1.125 [of the OECD Guidelines] apply”.18 
The US Regulations likewise state that, in determining 
the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the 
“Commissioner will evaluate the results of a transaction 
as actually structured by the taxpayer unless its structure 
lacks economic substance”.19
How should the actual controlled transaction be delin-
eated? According to the BEPS Actions 8-10 Final Reports:
[w]here a transaction has been formalised by the associated en-
terprises through written contractual agreements, those agree-
ments provide the starting point for delineating the transaction 
between them and how the responsibilities, risks, and anticip-
ated outcomes arising from their interaction were intended to be 
divided at the time of entering into the contract.20
The BEPS Actions 8-10 Final Reports go on to state:
However, the written contracts alone are unlikely to provide all the 
information necessary to perform a transfer pricing analysis, or to 
provide information regarding the relevant contractual terms in 
a judgment of its true nature” (US: DC (E.D. La.), 29 Jan. 1976, Univer-
sal Drilling Co. v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (E.D. La. 1976)).
15. US: SC, 28 May 1974, Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & 
Milling Co., 417 US 134, 148 (1974); US: CA (8th Cir.), 3 May 2004, Arm-
strong v. United States, 366 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004). Similarly, the 
Canadian Supreme Court has stated that “[u]nless the Act provides oth-
erwise, a taxpayer is entitled to be taxed based on what it actually did, 
not based on what it could have done, and certainly not based on what 
a less sophisticated taxpayer might have done” (CA: SC, 15 Oct. 1999, 
Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, (1999) 3 SCR 622). As Bullen points out, this 
principle can also be found in other OECD Member and non-Member 
countries, which suggests a widespread recognition of this “as-structured 
principle” (A. Bullen, Arm’ s Length Transaction Structures: Recognizing and 
Restructuring Controlled Transactions in Transfer Pricing (IBFD 2011), ch. 
6, sec. 6.2.4., Online Books IBFD).
16. Bullen, supra n. 15, at ch. 4, sec. 4.2 & Ch. 6, sec. 6.1.1.7.
17. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 1.64 (emphasis added). See 
also OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation – 
Actions 8-10 Final Reports, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
ing Project (OECD 5 Oct. 2015), paras. 1.121, 1.33, International Orga-
nizations’ Documentation IBFD. As Bullen points out, both the OECD 
Guidelines and the US regulations require taking “into account the struc-
ture and valuation of the controlled transaction, but also the ‘facts and 
circumstances surrounding [it]’” (Bullen, supra n. 15, at ch. 14, sec. 14.1). 
Furthermore, “[t]he pertinent issue under the arm’ s length principle is 
which conditions unrelated enterprises would have made in “comparable 
transactions and comparable circumstances” (Bullen, supra n. 15, at ch. 
14, sec. 14.1; OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 1.6; US Treas. 
Reg. sec. 1.482-1(b)(1)).
18. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at para. 1.121.
19. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(f)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
20. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at para. 1.42.
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sufficient detail. Further information will be required by taking 
into consideration evidence of the commercial or financial rela-
tions provided by the economically relevant characteristics in the 
other four categories (see paragraph 1.36): the functions performed 
by each of the parties to the transaction, taking into account assets 
used and risks assumed, together with the characteristics of prop-
ertytransferred or services provided, the economic circumstances of 
the parties and of the market in which the parties operate, and 
the business strategies pursued by the parties.21
The US Regulations similarly require that the same factors 
be taken into account:22 “the functions performed, and as-
sociated resources employed, by the taxpayers in each 
transaction”;23 “the significant contractual terms that could 
affect the results of the two transactions”;24 “the signifi-
cant risks that could affect the prices that would be charged 
or paid, or the profit that would be earned, in the two 
transactions”;25 and “the property or services transferred in 
the transactions”.26
The BEPS Actions 8-10 Final Reports further state that 
“[t]aken together, the analysis of economically relevant 
characteristics in all five categories provides evidence of 
the actual conduct of the associated enterprises”.27 This evi-
dence will be relied on to verify whether the parties’ for-
mally conveyed intentions, as they were expressed/implied 
by the parties, are in line with the agreement they actu-
ally executed (see section 2.3.3.). Moreover, this evidence 
forms the basis for comparing the controlled transaction 
to uncontrolled transaction(s), unless the law allows 
recharacterization of the actual controlled transaction. 
These characteristics are therefore also referred to as com-
parability factors.28 They form the basis for comparison 
because they may influence the arm’ s length party’ s deci-
sions as to what terms and conditions to agree to.29
Notably, this list of comparability factors “is not intended 
to be exhaustive, as consideration of all relevant factors is 
mandated”.30 The Canadian Tax Court has explained31 that 
21. Id., at para. 1.43 (emphasis added). See also para. 1.36.
22. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(1).
23. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
24. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).
25. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii) (emphasis added).
26. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(v) (emphasis added).
27. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at para. 1.43 (emphasis 
added). See also para. 1.36.
28. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 1.36, and sec. D.1.2; US Treas. 
Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(1).
29. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(A) (“In general. Determining the 
degree of comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled trans-
actions requires a comparison of the significant contractual terms that 
could affect the results of the two transactions”). OECD Guidelines (2010), 
supra n. 2, at para. 1.36 (“In order to establish the degree of actual com-
parability and then to make appropriate adjustments to establish arm’ s 
length conditions (or a range thereof), it is necessary to compare attri-
butes of the transactions or enterprises that would affect conditions in 
arm’ s length transactions”). See also paras. 1.33, 1.35; CA: TC, 4 Dec. 2009, 
General Electric Capital Canada, Inc. v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 563, para. 
198.
30. CA: TC, 29 Apr. 2010, Alberta Printed Circuits Ltd. v. The Queen, 2011 
TCC 305, para. 162, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. 
31. The Canadian Tax Court was following the courts’ comments in Alberta 
Printed Circuits, where Justice Pizzitelli noted as follows: “factors or cir-
cumstances that exist solely because of the non-arm’ s length relationship 
of the parties should not be ignored, otherwise the reasonable business-
man would not be standing entirely in the Appellant’ s shoes… In General 
Electric, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that no error of law was 
made in taking into consideration the Appellant in that case, as a sub of its 
relevant factors are not limited to those which would arise 
in arm’ s length relations, but rather also include “those that 
arise from, derive from or are rooted in the non-arm’ s 
length relationship”,32 i.e. comparability factors that exist 
only because of the non-arm’ s length relationship. It is also 
notable that, as Justice Hogan cautioned in the General 
Electric Capital Canada case, the “Crown cannot pick and 
choose among the economically relevant characteristics of 
the transaction and use only those facts that are favour-
able to its position”.33
2.3.  Determining the contractual terms: A three-step 
process
2.3.1.  Step 1: Identifying the terms
Turning the focus to the task of delineating the contrac-
tual terms, the first step necessarily requires identifying the 
terms agreed to by the parties.34 These will typically be set 
out in a written contract.35 The BEPS Actions 8-10 Final 
Reports state that “[t]he terms of a transaction may also be 
found in communications between the parties other than 
a written contract”,36 and that “[w]here no written terms 
exist, the actual transaction would need to be deduced 
from the evidence of actual conduct provided by iden-
tifying the economically relevant characteristics of the 
transaction”.37
The BEPS Actions 8-10 Final Reports go on to state as 
follows:
If the contract neither explicitly nor implicitly […] addresses 
characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant, 
then any information provided by the contract should be supple-
mented for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis by the evi-
dence provided by identifying those characteristics.38
The OECD approach to identifying the contractual terms 
appears to be in line with ordinary contract law principles. 
In Canada, for example, “[f]or a contract to be binding, 
the parties must come to the same determination, which 
must be disclosed by written or spoken words, or by some 
other signification of intention from which an implication 
of law, or an inference of fact, or both, may arise”.39 The 
Canadian Encyclopedic Digest explains as follows:
In determining whether the parties have reached agreement for 
legal purposes, the starting point must be the alleged contract 
larger parent company, stood in the position of having an implicit guar-
antee by its parent of its bank debts” (paras. 160, 162). 
32. CA: TC, 13 Dec. 2013, McKesson Canada Corp. v. The Queen, 2013 TCC 
404, para. 131.
33. CA: General Electric Capital Canada (2009), para. 249.
34. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at para. 1.42; OECD, Guid-
ance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles – Action 8: 2014 Deliverable, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 16 Sept. 
2014), at 40, ch. VI, B1, para. 6.35, International Organizations’ Docu-
mentation IBFD.
35. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at para. 1.42. In the United 
States, see US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1).
36. Id., at para. 1.42.
37. Id., at para. 1.49. In the United States, see US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)
(ii)(B)(2) (“In the absence of a written agreement, the district director may 
impute a contractual agreement between the controlled taxpayers con-
sistent with the economic substance of the transaction. In determining 
the economic substance of the transaction, greatest weight will be given 
to the actual conduct of the parties and their respective legal rights”).
38. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at para. 1.43.
39. Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Carswell 2010), Contracts, I.2, sec. 2.
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itself. If there is a written contract whose wording reveals a plain 
and unambiguous intention, that will ordinarily be the end of the 
matter. But where it is unclear whether or not the parties have in 
fact agreed, the court may resort to evidence beyond the con-
tractual language, including the factual matrix in existence at the 
relevant time and the genesis and aim of the transaction. The 
conduct of the parties during and subsequent to the purported 
making of a contract is also admissible to determine whether they 
did in fact make a binding contract, and, if they did, what the 
contractual terms were.40
The parties may present evidence to establish the terms 
they agreed to.41 They could also present evidence “for 
the purpose of showing that no contract in fact exists, or 
that the contract does not correctly set out the agreement 
between the parties”.42
2.3.2.  Step 2: Interpreting the terms to ascertain and give 
effect to the intentions of the parties
2.3.2.1.  The need to ascertain the contractual intentions of 
the parties
A common thread in the law of contracts, in both civil law43 
and common law44 jurisdictions, is that the true nature 
of a contract is based on the parties’ agreed intentions.45 
As the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal explained, the 
essence of a contractual relationship is the intention of 
the parties,46 and thus “in determining the legal nature of 
a contract, it is a search for the common intention of the 
parties that is the object of the exercise”.47
40. Canadian Encyclopedic Digest, Contracts, supra n. 39, at I.2, sec. 5.
41. Where the contract consists of oral terms, the parties may present written 
evidence of those oral terms. Such evidence is a memorandum of the oral 
terms, rather than a written agreement; unless, as a matter of fact, the court 
finds that the written document itself constitutes a written agreement 
(I. Goldsmith & T. Heintzman, Goldsmith on Canadian Building Contracts, 
4th ed. (Carswell 1995), quoted in CA: NSSC, 19 Jan. 2010, Busch Mac 
Developments Ltd. v. Harris, 2009 NSSC 381, paras. 22-24).
42. Goldsmith & Heintzman, supra n. 41, at para. 20.
43. European Contract Law – Materials for a Common Frame of Reference: 
Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules (B. Fauvarque-Cosson & D. 
Mazeaud eds., Sellier European Law Publishers 2008), at 182.
44. In the United States, see US: CA (5th Cir.), 29 May 1967, Pickren v. US, 378 
F.2d 595 (1967), at 599; US: DC, 9 Oct. 1957, In re Proctor, 156 F. Supp. 868, 
at 869 (W.D. Wash. 1957); US: CC, 11 June 1971, Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. US, 444 F.2d 547, 551 (Ct. Cl. 1971), cited in US: CA (Fed. Cir.), 29 
Jan. 1988, Beta Systems, Inc. v. US, 838 F.2d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
US: CFC, 20 Mar. 2012, Horn & Associates, Inc. v. US, 104 Fed. Cl. 121, 129 
(2012); US: Mo. CA (Springfield Mo.), 28 July 1955, Cook v. Tide Water As-
sociated Oil Co., 281 SW2d 415 (1955), at 420. In Canada, see CA: SC, 31 
Oct. 1996, Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin, (1996) 3 SCR 415, para. 79; 
CA: SC, 19 Nov. 1992, Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Com-
mercial Bank, (1992) 3 SCR 558, para. 52; CA: SC, 21 Nov. 2008, Canadian 
National Railway v. Royal & SunAlliance Insurance Co. of Canada, (2008) 
3 SCR 453, para. 73; CA: Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), 30 
April 1999, Kids Playworld Amusements and Playground Inc. v. Vicell Hold-
ings Ltd., 1999 O.T.C. LEXIS 2030; 99 O.T.C. 116, para. 24. 
45. A. Pichhadze, Exposing Unaddressed Issues in the OECD’ s BEPS Project: 
What About the Roles and Implications of Contract Interpretation Law and 
Private International Law in the Transfer Pricing Arm’ s Length Compara-
bility Analysis?, 7 World Tax J. 1 (2015), at 99, 131-132, Journals IBFD. 
As McMeel explains, for many the whole purpose of the law of contract 
is to give effect to the contractual intentions of the parties (G. McMeel, 
The Construction of Contracts, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press 2011), at 
36-37).
46. CA: FCA, 15 Mar. 2002, Wolf v. The Queen, (2002) 4 FCR 396, 2002 FCA 
96, para. 117.
47. CA: FCA, 2 Mar. 2006, Royal Winnipeg Ballet v. Minister of National 
Revenue, 2006 FCA 87, para. 59. See also CA: FCA, 30 Jan. 2003, Poulin v. 
Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2003 FCA 50, para. 27; CA: FCA, 
13 Feb. 2004, Le Livreur Plus Inc. v.Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 
Considering the primacy attributed to the common inten-
tions of the parties,48 it is generally recognized that the 
function of courts is to “strive to give effect to what the 
parties reasonably intended to agree to when the contract 
was made”.49 This applies in any type of dispute involving 
contracts – be it a dispute between the parties (e.g. over the 
formation or enforcement of the contract) or a dispute with 
tax authorities over the correctness of tax liability based 
on the effects of the contract,50 for example. Accordingly, 
Justice Campbell of the Canadian Tax Court recently held 
that “[a] determination of the intent of the parties and the 
scope of their understanding should be the court’ s over-
riding concern and the present-day approach that should 
be applied”.51 Similarly, the US Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit has stated that “in applying federal law to 
determine the tax consequences of a transaction […] we 
look to the intention of the parties”.52
Hence, after having identified the terms of the contract, 
it is necessary to interpret the terms in order to ascertain 
and give effect to the contractual intentions of the parties.53 
This has been firmly established by domestic courts around 
the world. As the Canadian Supreme Court explained, 
“[t]he cardinal interpretative rule of contracts is that the 
court should give effect to the intentions of parties as 
expressed in their written document”.54 Similarly, the UK 
Supreme Court stated that “the ultimate aim of interpret-
(2004) FCJ 267, para.17; CA: FCA, 1996, Continental Bank Leasing Corp. 
v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 199 N.R. 9, para. 19. 
48. In Canada, see CA: Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin (1996); see CA: 
OSCJ, 26 June 2012, Barrick Gold Corporation v. Goldcorp. Inc., 2011 
ONSC 3725 (CanLII), para. 223, accessable at http://canlii.ca/t/frv04 
(accessed on 5 April 2016); CA: OCA, 1907, Pense v. Northern Life Assur-
ance Co., 15 OLR 131 (Ont. C.A.), at 137. In the United States, see US: Cook 
v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co. (1955), at 420; US: Pickren (1967), at 599. 
49. CA: BCCA, 31 July 2014, Miller v. Convergys CMG Canada Limited Part-
nership, 2014 BCCA 311, para. 15. As Samuel Williston explained, “in 
the case of contracts, the avowed purpose and primary function of the 
court is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties” (S. Williston, A 
Treatise on the Law of Contracts, vol. 4, 3rd ed. (Walter H.E. Jaeger, Baker, 
Voorhis and Company, Inc., 1961), sec. 601, quoted with approval in US: 
CC, 15 Apr. 1966, North American Philips Co. v. US, 358 F.2d 980, 982, 
175 Ct. Cl. 71, 75 (1966); US: CC, 17 Dec. 1965, Chase & Rice, Inc. v. US, 
354 F.2d 318, 321, 173 Ct. Cl. 740, 745-746 (1965); US: CC, 19 Jan. 1968, 
Dynamics Corp. of America v. US, 389 F.2d 424, 429-30 (Ct. Cl. 1968); US: 
CA (Fed. Cir.), 14 Apr. 1987, Alvin Ltd. v. US Postal Serv., 816 F.2d 1562, 
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
50. CA: TC, 9 June 2014, Henco Industries Ltd. v. The Queen, 2014 TCC 192, 
para. 90.
51. CA: TC, 23 Dec. 2004, Invesco Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, 2014 TCC 375, 
para. 41. See also CA: SC, 1 Aug. 2014, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston 
Moly Corp. (2014) 2 SCR 633, 2014 SCC 53, para. 47; CA: TC, 5 June 
2009, Cummings v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 310, para. 20; CA: BCCA, 1984, 
Gallen v. Nunweiler, 53 B.C.L.R. 38.
52. US: CA (4th Cir.), 9 July 2009, Volvo Cars of North America, LLC v. US, 571 
F.3d 373, at 379. Similarly, the US Tax Court has stated that its function is 
to give contractual agreements “a construction that is reasonable, capable 
of being carried into effect and in accord with the parties’ intentions” (US: 
TC, 25 Aug. 1994, Fisher v. Commissioner, TC Memo, 1994-434, at 6).
53. Yet, it should not be assumed that courts necessarily adhere to this car-
dinal rule of interpretation. On the contrary, as the Canadian Federal 
Court of Appeal acknowledged, courts “in their propensity to create arti-
ficial legal categories, have sometimes overlooked the very factor which is 
the essence of a contractual relationship, i.e. the intention of the parties” 
(CA: Wolf (2002), para. 117).
54. CA: Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin (1996), para. 79. See also CA: 
Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (1992), 
para. 52; CA: Canadian National Railway v. Royal & SunAlliance Insur-
ance Co. of Canada (2008), para. 73; CA: Kids Playworld Amusements and 
Playground Inc. v. Vicell Holdings Ltd. (1999), para. 24.
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ing a provision in a contract, especially a commercial con-
tract, is to determine what the parties meant”.55 This cardi-
nal rule and objective was also echoed by the US Supreme 
Court, which held as follows:
All contracts are to be construed to accomplish the intention of 
the parties; and in determining their different provisions, a liberal 
and fair construction will be given to the words, either singly or in 
connection with the subject-matter. It is not the duty of a court, 
by legal subtlety, to overthrow a contract, but rather to uphold it 
any give it effect; and no strained or artificial rule of construc-
tion is to be applied to any part of it. If there is no ambiguity, and 
the meaning of the parties can be clearly ascertained, effect is to 
be given to the instrument used […] the main canon of interpre-
tation of a contract, is to ascertain what the parties themselves 
meant and understood.56
This is also recognized at the international level, as evident 
from the UN Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods57 and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts. Article 4.1 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, which is similar to article 8(1)-
(2) of the UN Convention, states that:
(1) A contract shall be interpreted according to the common 
intention of the parties.
(2) If such an intention cannot be established, the contract shall 
be interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons 
of the same kind as the parties would give to it in the same cir-
cumstances.
In his comment58 on the OECD Discussion Draft on BEPS 
Actions 8, 9 and 1059 as well as in his subsequent article in 
the World Tax Journal,60 the present author critically noted 
that the existing Guidelines as well as the Discussion Draft 
on BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10 failed to acknowledge the 
central role of the contractual intentions of the parties in 
delineating the actual transaction. Fortunately, in its BEPS 
Actions 8-10 Final Reports, the OECD responded by cor-
recting this oversight. The revised version of the OECD 
Guidelines now explicitly acknowledges that:
[t]he controlled transactions may have been formalised in writ-
ten contracts which may reflect the intention of the parties at the 
time the contract was concluded in relation to aspects of the 
transaction covered by the contract, including in typical cases 
the division of responsibilities, obligations and rights, assump-
tion of identified risks, and pricing arrangements.61
55. UK: SC, 2 Nov. 2011, Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank, (2011) UKSC 50, 
para. 14.
56. US: SC, Dec. 1865, In re The Binghamton Bridge, 70 US 51, 74-76 (1865). 
More recently, the US Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit stated that 
“[t]he paramount goal of contract interpretation is to determine the intent 
of the parties” (US: CA (3rd Cir.), 23 Nov. 2001, Garden State Tanning, Inc. 
v. Mitchell Mfg. Grp., Inc., 273 F.3d 332, 335 (3rd Cir. 2001); US: United 
States Court of Appeals (Third Circuit), 29 March 2011, Baldwin v. Univ. 
of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 75 (3rd Cir. 2011)). 
57. UN, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (2010), art. 8, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
58. OECD, Comments Received on Public Discussion Draft – BEPS Actions 8, 9 
and 10: Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Including 
Risk, Recharacterisation, and Special Measures) – Part 1 (OECD 10 Feb. 
2015), Comments by Pichhadze, at 72.
59. OECD, Discussion Draft, BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10: Discussion Draft on 
Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Including Risk, 
Recharacterisation, and Special Measures) (OECD 1 Dec. 2014).
60. Pichhadze, supra n. 45, at 144.
61. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at para. 1.42 (emphasis 
added).
Accordingly, the OECD recommends that:
[w]here a transaction has been formalised by the associated en-
terprises through written contractual agreements, those agree-
ments provide the starting point for delineating the transaction 
between them and how the responsibilities, risks, and anticip-
ated outcomes arising from their interaction were intended to be 
divided at the time of entering into the contract.62
The Guidelines go on to caution that if the parties were 
to change their terms over time, it would be necessary 
to determine whether the change reveals an alternation 
of the intentions of the parties, in which case the trans-
action would have been transformed from the time of that 
change.63 Moreover, considering the cardinal importance 
of ascertaining and giving effect to the intentions of the 
parties, the OECD Guidelines also recommend as follows:
It is, therefore, good practice for associated enterprises to docu-
ment their decisions and intentions regarding the allocation of sig-
nificant rights in intangibles. Documentation of such decisions 
and intentions, including written agreements, should generally be 
in place at or before the time that associated enterprises enter into 
transactions leading to the development, enhancement, mainte-
nance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles.64
2.3.2.2.  The need to delineate the intentions of the parties in 
accordance with the applicable law of contractual 
interpretation
Any and every type of legal text requires legal interpreta-
tion in order to ascertain its legal meaning based on the 
intentions of the parties.65 In his treatise, Wigmore stated 
that “[i]nterpretation is a process that always occurs when 
a court applies a contract, even if the text is so clear that 
only one outcome seems to be possible”.66 Wigmore went 
on to explain that “the process of interpretation, then, 
though it is commonly simple and often unobserved, is 
always present, being inherently indispensable”.67
Where a party in litigation is “seeking to have a contract 
interpreted in a particular manner,” it “bears the burden 
of establishing with reasonable clarity the correctness of 
such an interpretation”.68 But, while the parties in a dispute 
may offer their own interpretation, it is ultimately the task 
of the courts to determine the proper interpretation of the 
terms.69 In carrying out this task, “[i]t is the duty of the 
courts to give effect to contracts and testamentary dispo-
sitions according to the settled rules and principles of law, 
since we are under a reign of law […]”.70 In other words, 
courts are not free to determine the meaning of contrac-
tual terms haphazardly or based on any random source of 
62. Id., at para. 1.42 (emphasis added).
63. Id., at para. 1.47.
64. Id., at para. 6.36 (emphasis added).
65. AU: NSWCA, 6 June 2014, Mainteck Services Pty v. Stein Heurtey SA and 
Another, (2014) NSWCA 184, para. 73; CA: Pense (1907), at 137.
66. G.R. Hall, Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law, 2nd ed. (LexisNexis 
Canada 2012), at 14.
67. J.H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law, 3rd ed. (Little Brown & Co 1940), vol. 9, at 180, cited in 
AU: Mainteck Services Pty.
68. Canadian Encyclopedic Digest, Contracts, supra n. 39, at IX.13, cited with 
approval in CA: SKPC, 29 Jan. 2012, Sander Holdings Ltd. v. McDiarmid 
Lumber Ltd., 2012 SKPC 19, at 152.
69. CA: FC, 18 June 1015, Adir v. Apotex Inc., 2015 FC 721, paras. 31, 51,
70. CA: SC, 22 Dec. 1937, In Re Estate of Charles Millar, (1938) SCR 1, at 4.
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law and/or principles.71 The terms must be interpreted in 
accordance with the law of interpretation that governs the 
contract in question.72 Only then can a court proceed to 
determine the issue in dispute with regard to the contract, 
such as the correctness of a tax assessment that is based on 
the contract in question. As Lord Greene of the UK Court 
of Appeal explained:
In considering tax matters a document is not to have placed on it 
a strained or forced construction in order to attract tax, nor is a 
strained or forced construction to be placed on it in order to avoid 
tax. The document must be construed in the ordinary way and the 
provisions of the relevant tax legislation then applied to it. If, on its 
true construction, it falls within a certain taxing category, then 
it is taxed. If, on its true construction, it falls outside the taxing 
category, then it escapes tax.73
In his comments to the OECD on the Discussion Draft on 
BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10,74 the author alerted the OECD 
as to the need to have the OECD Guidelines explicitly 
acknowledge the necessary role of contract interpreta-
tion law in a transfer pricing arm’ s length comparabil-
ity analysis.75 Subsequently, the author further elaborated 
on this issue in articles that were published in the World 
Tax Journal76 and the International Transfer Pricing Jour-
nal.77 Fortunately, in its BEPS Actions 8-10 Final Reports, 
the OECD responded by correcting this oversight. Para-
graph 1.43 of the revised OECD Guidelines now explic-
itly requires “taking into account applicable principles of 
contract interpretation” when delineating the contractual 
terms of a controlled transaction.78
2.3.3.  Step 3: Verifying the formalized terms based on the 
substance of the agreement
Once the contract terms have been identified and inter-
preted, it is then necessary to verify whether the parties’ 
conveyed intentions (as they were formally expressed by 
the terms) are in line with the intentions demonstrated by 
the agreement that they actually executed.79 Verification is 
necessary because, as the OECD explains, it may be that 
“the parties’ actual conduct indicates that the contractual 
71. Pichhadze, supra n. 45, at 125, 144.
72. As Pichhadze explains, “when a cross-border transaction is under review, 
determining which source of contract law actually governs the contract 
gives rise to a question of private international law […] the transaction 
could potentially be governed by the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). If the Convention does 
not apply, it then becomes necessary to determine which domestic juris-
diction’ s law governs” (Pichhadze, supra n. 45, at 120).
73. UK: HL, 19 Nov. 1946, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Wesleyan and 
General Assurance Society, [1946] 2 All ER 749 (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, in Meiselman, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated 
that “[w]e are not to categorize the transaction in such a way as to milk the 
most taxes therefrom, nor are we to allow ourselves to be deceived by any 
effort to disguise its true nature in order to avoid a proper consequence” 
(US: CA (4th Cir.), 14 Mar. 1962, Meiselman v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 
666, 668 (4th Cir. 1962)). 
74. OECD, Actions 8, 9 and 10 Discussion Draft, supra n. 59, at paras. 5, 84.
75. OECD, Comments on Actions 8, 9 and 10 Discussion Draft – Part 1, supra 
n. 58, Comments by Pichhadze.
76. Pichhadze, supra n. 45.
77. A. Pichhadze, Allocation of Income and Deductions among Taxpayers under 
Section 482 of the United States Internal Revenue Code: Alerting the Courts 
to the Role of Contractual Interpretation Law in the Transfer Pricing Arm’ s 
Length Comparability Analysis, 22 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 3 (2015), 156, 
Journals IBFD.
78. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at 18, para. 1.43.
79. Id., at paras.1.46, 1.120, 6.73.
terms have not been followed, do not reflect a complete 
picture of the transactions, have been incorrectly charac-
terised or labelled by the taxpayer, or are a sham”.80 This 
risk is particularly acute in non-arm’ s length transactions, 
but it can also arise in other types of circumstances, such 
as employment contracts.81
The transaction that the parties actually executed in 
reality, as evidenced by their conduct, is treated as repres-
enting the best evidence of the actual/true nature/substance 
of their agreement.82 As the substance of the agreement 
is evidenced by the agreement actually executed by the 
parties, the agreement which they formally purported to 
undertake (as conveyed by their terms) will be given effect 
only if it is consistent with the agreement they actually exe-
cuted.83 If it is found that the formally conveyed intentions 
of the parties do not reflect the substance of their agree-
ment, the expressed terms would need to be adjusted by 
the tax authorities to reflect the transaction that they actu-
ally executed.84 Here, the adjustment is applied in order to 
accurately delineate the controlled transaction “actually” 
80. Id., at para. 1.46.
81. As the Canadian Tax Court explained in Grimard, “[e]ven if the contract-
ing parties have manifested their intention in their written or oral con-
tract or if their intention can be inferred from their conduct, this does not 
mean that the courts will necessarily view it as determinative […] per-
formance of the contract must be consistent with this intention. Thus, the 
fact that the parties have called their contract a ‘contract for services’ and 
have stipulated both that the work will be done by an ‘independentcon-
tractor’ and that there is no employer-employee relationship does not 
necessarily make the contract a contract for services. It could in fact be 
a contract of employment. As article1425C.C.Q. states, one must look 
to the real common intention of the parties rather than adhere to the 
literal meaning of the words used in the contract” (CA: TC, 12 Oct. 2007, 
Grimard v. The Queen, 2007 TCC 755, para. 97). “Judges may therefore 
recharacterize the contract so that its name reflects reality” (para. 99). 
“[T]his verification that the actual relationship and the parties’ description 
of it are consistent is necessary when interpreting contracts of employ-
ment since the parties may have an interest in disguising the true nature 
of the contractual relationship between the payer and the worker. Expe-
rience shows, in fact, that some employers, wanting to reduce their fiscal 
burden with respect to their employees, sometimes decide to treat them as 
independent contractors. Thisdecision can be made either at the outset of 
the contractual relationship or later on. Similarly, some employees could 
have an interest in disguising their contract of employment as a con-
tract for services because the circumstances are such that they do not 
foresee that they will need employment insurance benefits and they want 
to eliminate their employee contributions to the employment insurance 
program, or they desire more freedom to deduct certain expenses in com-
puting their income under the Income Tax Act” (para. 100). On appeal, 
the FCA upheld the trial court’ s approach and analysis on the need to, as 
well as on how to, verify the parties’ formally conveyed intentions when 
determining the character of a contract (CA: FCA, 19 Feb. 2009, Grimard 
v. Canada, [2009] 4 FCR 592, 2009 FCA 47 (CanLII), paras. 32-33, 47-48). 
82. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at paras. 1.46, 1.88.
83. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1) (“The contractual terms 
[…] that are agreed to in writing before the transactions are entered into 
will be respected if such terms are consistent with the economic substance 
of the underlying transactions”).
84. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at para. 1.46 (“Where there 
are material differences between contractual terms and the conduct of the 
associated enterprises in their relations with one another, the functions 
they actually perform, the assets they actually use, and the risks they actu-
ally assume, considered in the context of the contractual terms, should 
ultimately determine the factual substance and accurately delineate the 
actual transaction”). US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1) (“If the 
contractual terms are inconsistent with the economic substance of the 
underlying transaction, the district director may disregard such terms 
and impute terms that are consistent with the economic substance of the 
transaction”). See also US Treas. Reg. 1.482-1T(f)(2)(i), Example 6(v).
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undertaken, rather than to recharacterize the transaction 
“actually” undertaken.85
In In re DeCoro USA, Ltd., for example, the US Bank-
ruptcy Court had to consider whether an intercompany 
distribution agreement (IDA) should be adjusted under 
section 482. Justice Stocks held that “[w]hile the IDA may 
provide some indication of the functions of the Debtor 
and the nature of the controlled transactions, the court 
should respect only those terms that are consistent with 
the economic substance of the underlying transactions, 
i.e., consistent with how the Debtor actually operated”.86 
The judge went on to conclude as follows:
The provisions of the IDA are not consistent with the economic 
substance of the transactions at issue. The relationship between the 
Debtor and LTD and the manner in which the Debtor actually 
conducted business were vastly different than portrayed in the 
IDA. According to the evidence, the economic substance of the 
Debtor’ s relationship with LTD and the Debtor’ s actual opera-
tions, the Debtor was neither independent nor a distributor that 
bought and sold furniture. Instead, the evidence showed that the 
Debtor existed and functioned to facilitate sales that were made 
within the United States by LTD directly to end customers. That 
reality, and not the fictitious business model described in the IDA is 
the proper basis for evaluating whether the Debtor’ s income should 
be adjusted under section 482.87
This task of verification is necessary even where the inten-
tions of the parties have not been contested. As the Cana-
dian Federal Court of Appeal explained, “if the intention 
of the parties is uncontested […] the common law judge 
has nevertheless the responsibility to ‘look to see’ if the 
terms used and the surrounding circumstances are com-
patible with what the parties say their contract is”.88
Notably, this approach reflects the substance-over-form 
principle which permeates domestic tax laws around the 
world. In the United States, for example, the Tax Court 
recently explained that:
[t]he incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a trans-
action […]. Before recharacterizing a transaction’ s form to align 
with its substance, we conduct “a searching analysis of the facts to 
see whether the true substance of the transaction is different from 
its form or whether the form reflects what actually happened”.89
Similarly in Canada, the Tax Court explained that “the law 
requires the Court to look at the substance of the arrange-
ment between the parties and not just the title. If the sub-
85. Bullen, supra n. 15, at ch. 8, sec. 8.4.2.4.
86. US: BC, 29 Oct. 2010, In re DeCoro USA, Ltd., Case 09-10846C-11G, 2014 
WL 1089795, at 4 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. Mar. 18, 2014), at 13. 
87. US: DeCoro (2010) (emphasis added).
88. CA: Royal Winnipeg Ballet (2006), para. 72.
89. US: TC, 23 Mar. 2015, CNT Investors, LLC v. Commissioner, Case 27539-
08, 144 TC 11, at 22. Similarly, the US Supreme Court has stated that “the 
incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction […] 
To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere for-
malisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair 
the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress” (US: SC, 12 
Mar. 1945, Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 US 331, 334 (1945)). 
Before the US Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, it was explained that 
“it is the intent of parties to a contract and what the contract really is, and 
not what form it takes, which is decisive” (US: CA (8th Cir.), 24 June 1957, 
Crown Iron Works Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 357, 359 (8th Cir. 1957)). 
Similarly, the US Tax Court explained that “a transaction’ s true substance 
rather than its nominal form governs its Federal tax treatment” (US: TC, 1 
Sept. 2011, Superior Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, 137 TC 70, 88 (2011), 
aff’d 728 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
stance of the arrangement is not in accord with the label 
put upon it by the parties, it is the substance which must 
prevail”.90 Yet, “attitude towards form and substance in tax 
law generally and tax avoidance in particular varies greatly 
from country to country both with regard to the way they 
approach the issues and how far they are prepared to let 
substance prevail over form”.91 For example, while some 
countries, such as the United States,92 give effect to the 
“economic substance” of the transaction, other countries, 
such as Canada, give effect to its “legal substance”.93
When looking at the agreement that the parties executed 
in reality, what aspect of that agreement, according to the 
OECD, ought to be taken into account and given effect? In 
the BEPS Actions 8-10 Final Reports, section D of Chapter 
I of the revised OECD Guidelines uses the term “factual 
substance”.94 In its summary of the revisions to Section D, 
the Final Reports explain that an objective of the OECD 
Guidelines is to ensure “that actual business transactions 
undertaken by associated enterprises are identified, and 
transfer pricing is not based on contractual arrangements 
that do not reflect economic reality”.95 Further insight can 
also be found in Chapter IX of the OECD Guidelines, 
which deals with the transfer pricing aspects of business 
restructuring. This chapter still uses the terminology “eco-
nomic substance,” which is found in Section D of Chapter I 
of the previous version of the OECD Guidelines (2010).96 
Hence, for the purpose of ascertaining the substance of the 
transaction, the OECD Guidelines remain focused on the 
economic substance of the transaction that was actually 
executed by the associated enterprises.97 Notably, the US 
Regulations similarly focus on the economic substance of 
the transaction(s).98
The OECD Guidelines explain as follows:
The economic substance of a transaction or arrangement is deter-
mined by examining all of the facts and circumstances, such as the 
economic and commercial context of the transaction or arrange-
ment, its object and effect from a practical and business point of 
view, and the conduct of the parties, including the functions per-
formed, assets used and risks assumed by them.99
3.  Delineating the Terms Where Contracts Are 
Interrelated (Linked)
A transaction could be executed using either (i) a single 
contract or (ii) a series of separate but closely interrelated 
(linked) contracts which together make possible a “single 
composite transaction” (i.e. one “whole deal”, “plan”). The 
possibility of these alternative scenarios was at issue in, for 
example, GlaxoSmithKline Inc.
90. CA: TC, 22 Jan. 2001, Saskatchewan Deaf & Hard of Hearing Services Inc. 
v. Minister of National Revenue, (2001) TCJ 38, para. 29.
91. F. Zimmer, IFA Cahiers 2002 – Volume 87a. Form and Substance in Tax 
Law, General Report, at 19, 61-62, Online Books IBFD.
92. US: SC, 18 Apr. 1978, Frank Lyon Co. v. US, 435 US 561 (1978).
93. CA: TC, 21 April 2006, CCLI (1994) Inc. v. The Queen, (2006) TCC 240, 
para. 26. 
94. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at paras. 1.46, 1.120.
95. Id., at 13 (emphasis added).
96. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 1.48-49, 1.65.
97. J. Wittendorff, Transfer Pricing and the Arm’ s Length Principle in Interna-
tional Tax Law (Wolters Kluwer 2010), at 411, 772. 
98. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1); sec. 1.482-1T(f)(2)(i)(B).
99. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, para. 9.170.
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Glaxo Canada is a subsidiary of Glaxo Group, a UK 
company which itself is a subsidiary of Glaxo Holding 
Plc.100 This multinational enterprise is engaged in dis-
covering, developing, manufacturing and distributing 
pharmaceutical products throughout the world.101 Glaxo 
Canada is the distributor of Glaxo pharmaceutical prod-
ucts in Canada.102
This case involved Zantac, “a patented and trademarked 
drug used to treat stomach ulcers. Glaxo Group owned 
the Zantac trademark and the patent for its active ingre-
dient, ranitidine”.103 Glaxo Group sold to distributors 
around the world the rights to sell the drug, while also 
providing them with other related services, benefits and 
products. According to Glaxo Canada’ s witness at trial,104 
Glaxo Group’ s policy was that distributors would retain 
approximately 60% of their gross profit from the sale of 
the drug, while:
the remainder would be remitted back to Glaxo Group in the form 
of transfer price, royalties, [or both]. Where the distributor was to 
pay both transfer prices and royalties, they would be considered 
together to determine the distributor’ s gross profit margin after 
payment of the royalty.105
Different types of contractual arrangements where used 
to execute these transactions. In most countries, Glaxo 
Group entered into a single contract with its distributors. 
This package deal provided the rights to sell the drug and 
related services, as well as the raw material necessary to 
assemble the drug for sale (i.e. the Zantac ranitidine, a 
primary active pharmaceutical ingredient of Zantac106).107 
In contrast, Glaxo Canada was required to enter into two 
separate contracts. It had to enter into a licence agree-
ment with Glaxo Group.108 This licence agreement gave 
Glaxo Canada numerous rights and benefits/services, 
such as: “the right under the patents to manufacture, use 
and sell Glaxo Group products […] the exclusive right to 
the use of the trademarks owned by Glaxo Group, includ-
ing Zantac […] the right to receive technical assistance 
for its secondary manufacturing requirements […]”.109 
The licence agreement required Glaxo Canada to (i) pay 
“a six percent royalty to Glaxo Group on its net sales of 
Zantac”110 and (ii) enter into a supply agreement to pur-
chase the Zantac ranitidine from a Glaxo Group approved 
100. Glaxo (TCC), para. 10.
101. Glaxo (FCA), para. 8.
102. Glaxo (TCC), para. 10.
103. Glaxo (SCC), para. 6.
104. Glaxo (TCC), para. 76.
105. Glaxo (SCC), para. 8. As the trial judge explained, “[t]o use a very simple 
example, if the ranitidine product was sold for $10 in Italy, the transfer 
price would be $4; if the ranitidine product was sold for $20 in France, the 
transfer price would be $8” (Glaxo (TCC), para. 47, cited inGlaxo (SCC), 
para. 8).
106. Glaxo (TCC), para. 3. See also Factum of the Appellant (The Queen) sub-
mitted to Supreme Court in Glaxo, para. 9.
107. Glaxo (TCC), para. 50.
108. Id., para. 10.
109. Id., para. 7.
110. Id., para. 14.
source,111 which happened to be Adechsa (a Swiss affiliate 
of Glaxo Group).112
The Canadian Minister of National Revenue (the Minis-
ter) reassessed Glaxo Canada’ s income tax for the years 
1990-1993. At issue was the supply agreement. The Minis-
ter argued that the price paid to Adechsa (i.e. the “transfer 
price”) was not “reasonable in the circumstances” within 
the meaning of section 69(2) of the Income Tax Act.113 As 
Adechsa is not a resident in Canada and is an affiliate of 
Glaxo Group, the supply agreement was a cross-border 
controlled transaction that could fall within section 69(2). 
Glaxo Canada appealed the Minister’ s assessment to the 
Canadian Tax Court, where the trial judge was then Asso-
ciate Chief Justice Gerald J. Rip.
As Justice Rip explained:
[i]n transfer pricing cases, the goal of the MNE is to divert profits 
to a low tax jurisdiction. The amounts will be included in calcu-
lating the income of the recipient to whom they were diverted 
(in this case Adechsa), with the result being a lower rate of tax 
and more profits left for distribution to the parent company.114
Justice Rip described as follows the alleged income shift-
ing scheme in this case:
13  Adechsa had an agreement with the Swiss tax authorities 
under which it agreed to pay tax on the basis that it earned 
a minimum profit of four percent. Few taxes were paid by 
the Singapore manufacturer because it qualified for a ten-
year pioneer relief tax holiday that began in 1982. After 
the expiry of the ten-year period, the tax rate was ten per-
cent. Under the pioneer relief program, Glaxo World ben-
efited from “tax sparing” between Singapore and the United 
Kingdom. Glaxo World’ s Singapore company did not pay 
any tax on the profits earned in Singapore; income appar-
ently was deemed by the United Kingdom tax authority 
to have been fully taxed at the current Singapore tax rate. 
When the profits were brought into the United Kingdom 
in the form of dividends, United Kingdom tax was payable 
only on any excess in terms of the United Kingdom tax rate 
over the Singapore tax rate. Glaxo World’ s transfer pricing 
arrangements allowed Singapore to earn gross profits of 
around ninety percent in Singapore on the sale of raniti-
dine to Adechsa during the period 1990 to 1993. During 
the same period, Glaxo Canada was earning gross profits of 
around 57 percent. According to a memorandum by Lionel 
Halpern, the “Group” taxation controller of Glaxo Hold-
ings, Glaxo World’ s strategy to minimize its taxes world-
wide was:
 1. to make as much profit as possible in Singapore;
 2.  to make as much of the remainder of the Group’ s profit 
as possible in the U.K.; and
111. Id., para. 50. Under the licence agreement, Glaxo Canada was not given 
the freedom to purchase the raw material from sources other than a Glaxo 
approved source (Glaxo (TCC), para. 80). For this reason, the Supreme 
Court stated that “the rights and benefits of the Licence Agreement were 
contingent on Glaxo Canada entering into a Supply Agreement with sup-
pliers to be designated by Glaxo Group” (Glaxo (SCC), para. 49).
112. While the ranitidine was produced in Singapore, by Glaxochem (Pte) Sin-
gapore (Glaxo (TCC), para. 80), it was then distributed by Adechsa to local 
distributors around the world (Glaxo (TCC), para. 166). Adechsa was 
Glaxo Group’ s clearing company, located in Switzerland (Glaxo (SCC), 
para. 6). Adechsa’ s role in this process was, essentially, “to administer the 
transfer prices” (Glaxo (TCC), para. 15).
113. Glaxo (TCC), para. 1. At the time of this assessment, section 69(2) con-
tained Canada’ s transfer pricing rule. See Appendix 3 (section 9.3.) for 
the text of section 69(2).
114. Glaxo (TCC), para. 172.
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 3.  to ensure the Group does not pay tax on the same profit 
twice. […]
166  […] As set out in paragraph 13 of these reasons, Glaxo 
Group’ s taxation strategy was to minimize tax by shifting 
its profits to Singapore via Switzerland. Part of the strat-
egy included using Adechsa as a distributor and funneling 
the excess amounts through it. The corporate structure of 
Glaxo World was, in part, designed to minimize income in 
high tax jurisdictions by diverting income to low tax juris-
diction.115
In addition to shifting profits to Singapore via Switzer-
land, the scheme would also make it possible for Glaxo 
Canada to avoid Canadian withholding taxes. Justice Rip 
noted as follows:
Royalty payments in Canada are subject to withholding tax and 
the profit will accrue to Glaxo Group and be taxed in the United 
Kingdom. The purchase price for ranitidine is not subject to any 
withholding tax and the profit accrues in Switzerland, and ultimately 
in Singapore. To suggest that Glaxo Group does not care whether 
its profits are in the form of royalty payments or purchase price 
belittles the issue in these appeals.116
For the purpose of conducting the arm’ s length compa-
rability analysis under section 69(2), it was necessary to 
delineate the actual controlled transaction. The parties 
disputed the true nature of the transaction. More specifi-
cally, they disputed what Glaxo Canada was paying for.
The Minister suggested that the contractual terms were 
confined to those within the four corners of the supply 
agreement. Based on those terms, it was suggested that 
Glaxo Canada was essentially paying for the raw mate-
rial (i.e. goods) and nothing more. This view of the actual 
nature of the agreement would make it possible for the 
Minister to suggest that the proper arm’ s length compar-
ables were purchases of the generic ranitidine – which is 
chemically equivalent and bioequivalent to the Zantac 
ranitidine117 – by Apotex and Novopharm from arm’ s 
length manufacturers. In these transactions, Apotex and 
Novopharm were similarly paying for the raw material and 
nothing more.
Glaxo Canada’ s witness, Dr. J. Gregory Ballentine, charac-
terized the issue as “what would be the cost of selling raniti-
dine products in Canada?”.118 As the trial judge explained, 
“in doing so, he combined the royalty paid pursuant to 
the licence agreement with the purchase price for raniti-
dine hydrochloride paid to Adechsa to arrive at a bundle 
of goods and benefits received from the Glaxo World as 
a whole”.119 In other words, Glaxo Canada asserted that 
the transfer price was actually intended to be a bundled 
payment for the goods (i.e. the raw materials) received 
from Adechsa under the supply agreement, as well as for 
rights and services received from Glaxo Group under the 
licence agreement, and that this bundled payment was con-
sideration for one “whole deal”: to enable Glaxo Canada to 
manufacture and sell the Zantac drug in Canada.120
115. Id., paras. 13, 166.
116. Id., para. 77 (emphasis added).
117. Both parties agreed that the generic ranitidine is chemically equivalent 
and bioequivalent to the Zantac ranitidine (Glaxo (TCC), para. 118).
118. Glaxo (TCC), para. 75.
119. Id.
120. Id.
This alternative view of the actual nature of the controlled 
transaction made it possible for Glaxo Canada to argue 
that the arm’ s length transactions proposed by the Minis-
ter were not comparable. It also made it possible to suggest 
that alternative arm’ s length transactions should be used. 
These were purchases of Zantac ranitidine by Glaxo 
Group’ s European arm’ s length distributors.121 According 
to Glaxo Canada, these were comparable because “they 
purchased the same ranitidine under the same set of busi-
ness circumstances as the appellant”.122
Justice Rip accepted the Minister’ s view “that the Supply 
Agreement with Adechsa and the Licence Agreement with 
Glaxo Group cover separate matters and that they are to 
be considered independently”123 – in other words, that 
“the arm’ s length principle should be applied on a trans-
action-by-transaction basis”.124 With this focus on the con-
tractual terms of the supply agreement, Justice Rip agreed 
with the Minister’ s assertion that Glaxo Canada was essen-
tially paying for the raw material (i.e. goods) and nothing 
more.125 Accordingly, he accepted that the arm’ s length 
purchases of the generic ranitidine were comparable to 
the supply agreement.
In light of this, Justice Rip found it appropriate to deter-
mine the arm’ s length price using the CUP method, and 
to use the cost-plus method to verify this CUP method.126 
Based on this analysis, it was found that the price of the 
Zantac ranitidine ranged between CAD 1,512 to CAD 
1,651 per kilogram, whereas the fair market value of the 
generic ranitidine ranged between CAD 193 to CAD 304 
per kilogram. For this reason, it was appropriate for the 
Minister to adjust the price paid by Glaxo Canada, and to 
disallow deductions of its payments (to Adechsa) to the 
extent that they were “in excess of the highest monthly 
121. Yet, surprisingly and perplexingly, in its appeal to the Federal Court of 
Appeal and the Canadian Supreme Court, Glaxo Canada ended up aban-
doning its call to have the income allocation result in the supply agree-
ment compared to the arm’ s length result in the transactions involving 
the European distributors. Instead, Glaxo Canada managed to convince 
the FCA that section 69(2) requires comparing the supply agreement to 
a hypothetical uncontrolled transaction. The Federal Court of Appeal 
accepted this approach, irrespective of whether actual comparables 
existed, and even though both the Minister and Glaxo Canada asserted 
at trial that actual comparables did exist. For a detailed critique of the 
approach of the Federal Court of Appeal, see A. Pichhadze, The Arm’ s 
Length Comparable in Transfer Pricing: A Search for an “Actual” or a “Hypo-
thetical” Transaction?, 7 World Tax J. 3 (2015), at 383, Journals IBFD. 
122. Glaxo (TCC), para. 69. As Glaxo Canada explained in its factum to 
the Canadian Supreme Court, the European arm’ s length distributors 
“entered into licence agreements with Glaxo Group and supply agree-
ments with Adechsa on terms substantially similar to those entered into 
by Glaxo Canada in respect of the intellectual property, product support 
and API necessary to sell Glaxo-brand ranitidine products. Like Glaxo 
Canada, arm’ s length distributors were required to purchase ranitidine 
for sale under Glaxo trade marks from Glaxo Group-approved sourced” 
(Factum of the Respondent (GlaxoSmithKline Inc.), submitted on appeal 
to the Supreme Court, para. 26).
123. Glaxo (TCC), para. 78.
124. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 3.9; Glaxo (SCC), para. 32.
125. Rip explained that “the Supply Agreement also provided protection 
against foreign currency exchange, indemnity insurance and the provi-
sion of intellectual property to ‘the extent that [the appellant] shall not 
previously have received it or shall not otherwise receive it directly from 
[Glaxo Group]’” (Glaxo (TCC), para. 15). Yet, he accepted the Minister’ s 
view that this was essentially a supply of goods, as the raw materials were 
the only item of value received by Glaxo Canada (Glaxo (TCC), para. 16).
126. Glaxo (SCC), paras. 22-24.
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price per kilogram of ranitidine paid by Apotex and Novo-
pharm to their arm’ s length manufacturers”.127
On final appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court, the Min-
ister again submitted that “each transfer is to be treated as 
a separate transaction”.128 Al Meghji, Counsel for Glaxo 
Canada, alerted the Supreme Court as to the need for 
clarity on this issue. In his submission at the hearing before 
the Court, he stated as follows:
Madam Chief Justice, my submission to you is that question about 
when you have a particular good that is priced with different ele-
ments and it is a transaction that has different things in it, and when 
do you unbundle it? When do you separate it? Do you say that if 
it is essentially the good with some elements, it is okay, but there 
is more to it, then you don’t? That question is this whole debate 
about unbundling, which I don’t think can be answered in this 
context. And it really is the subject matter of some PhD thesis, 
because it is a troubling issue the OECD has talked about.129
The Supreme Court qualified the application of a trans-
action-by-transaction approach.130 In reaching its unani-
mous decision, it referred to the OECD Guidelines. Justice 
Rothstein noted that, according to paragraph 1.42 of the 
Guidelines (1995),131 “while a transaction-by-transaction 
approach may be ideal, the 1995 Guidelines themselves 
recognize that it is not appropriate in all cases”.132 He also 
noted that paragraph 1.42 provides that “[…] there are 
often situations where separate transactions are so closely 
linkedor continuous that they cannot be evaluated ade-
quately on a separate basis”.133 He went on to explain as 
follows:
according to the 1995 Guidelines, a proper application of the arm’ s 
length principle requires that regard be had for the “economically 
relevant characteristics” of the arm’ s length and non-arm’ s length 
circumstances to ensure they are “sufficiently comparable”. Where 
there are no related transactions or where related transactions 
are not relevant to the determination of the reasonableness of 
the price in issue, a transaction-by-transaction approach may be 
appropriate. However, “economically relevant characteristics of 
the situations being compared” may make it necessary to consider 
other transactions that impact the transfer price under consideration. 
In each case it is necessary to address this question by considering 
the relevant circumstances.134
Applying the OECD’ s recommendations to the trans-
action(s) in question, Justice Rothstein explained that the 
terms of the licence agreement would be linked to the trans-
fer price in the supply agreement if they would “impact the 
transfer price under consideration”.135 He suggested that 
such link may have existed because “the rights and ben-
efits of the Licence Agreement were contingent on Glaxo 
Canada entering into a Supply Agreement with suppliers 
to be designated by Glaxo Group”.136 Furthermore, “[t]he 
127. Factum of the Appellant (The Queen) submitted to the Supreme Court 
in Canada v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc., para. 20.
128. Glaxo (SCC), para. 32.
129. Transcript of The Queen v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (33874), at 17 (empha-
sis added). Reproduced with the permission of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, 2012, at 41, lines 7-14.
130. Glaxo (SCC), paras. 33-42.
131. Para. 3.9 of the current OECD Guidelines (2010) is essentially a restate-
ment of para. 1.42 of the OECD Guidelines (1995).
132. Glaxo (SCC), para. 40.
133. Id.
134. Id., para. 42 (emphasis added).
135. Id., para. 42 (emphasis added).
136. Id., para. 49. See also para. 46.
effect of the link between the Licence and Supply agree-
ments was that an entity that wished to market Zantac was 
subject to contractual terms affecting the price of raniti-
dine that generic marketers of ranitidine products were 
not”.137 Finally, Justice Rothstein stated as follows:
This requirement was not the product of the non-arm’ s length 
relationship between Glaxo Canada and Glaxo Group or 
Adechsa. Rather, it arose because Glaxo Group controlled the 
trademark and patent of the brand-name pharmaceutical prod-
uct Glaxo Canada wished to market. An arm’ s length distribu-
tor wishing to market Zantac might well be faced with the same 
requirement.138
Justice Rothstein refrained, however, from concluding that 
the agreement was in fact linked to the supply agreement.139 
Instead, he left the Canadian Tax Court to make that deter-
mination in a retrial.140 However, that retrial never took 
place because the taxpayer and the Minister ended up set-
tling their dispute.
4.  A Closer Look into the Task of Aggregation
Justice Rothstein held that “[i]f the circumstances require, 
transactions other than the purchasing transactions must 
be taken into account to determine whether the actual 
price was or was not greater than the amount that would 
have been reasonable had the parties been dealing at arm’ s 
length”.141 But what precisely is involved in carrying out this 
task? Justice Rothstein merely directed that the trial judge 
examine the terms of the licence agreement.142 Unfortu-
nately, the Canadian Supreme Court missed the opportu-
nity to clarify how a linked transaction ought to be taken 
into account.
The OECD Guidelines provide examples of linked trans-
actions and explain as follows how to deal with them:
Examples may include 1. some long-term contracts for the sup-
ply of commodities or services, 2. rights to use intangible prop-
erty, and 3. pricing a range of closely-linked products (e.g. in a 
product line) when it is impractical to determine pricing for each 
individual product or transaction. Another example would be 
the licensing of manufacturing know-how and the supply of vital 
components to an associated manufacturer; it may be more rea-
sonable to assess the arm’ s length terms for the two items together 
rather than individually... A further example would be the routing 
of a transaction through another associated enterprise; it may be 
more appropriate to consider the transaction of which the routing 
is a part in its entirety, rather than consider the individual trans-
actions on a separate basis.143
In the BEPS Actions 8-10 Final Reports, the recently 
revised OECD Guidelines state that “[i]n situations where 
services and transfers of intangibles are intertwined, deter-
137. Id., para. 48.
138. Id., para. 47.
139. Id., paras. 54, 57.
140. Id., para. 57.
141. Id., para. 38. See also para. 53.
142. In the words of Justice Rothstein: “I agree with Justice Nadon that ‘the 
amount that would have been reasonable in the circumstances’ if Glaxo 
Canada and Adechsa had been dealing at arm’ s length has yet to be deter-
mined. This will require a close examination of the terms of the Licence 
Agreement and the rights and benefits granted to Glaxo Canada under 
that Agreement” (Glaxo (SCC), para. 54).
143. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (OECD 1995), para. 1.42 (emphasis added); OECD 
Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 3.9.
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mining arm’ s length prices on an aggregate basis may be 
necessary”.144 Unfortunately, this guidance fails to provide 
sufficiently specific and detailed guidance about this task 
of aggregation, which leaves open the risk of misconcep-
tions of the task at hand.
Fortunately, shortly after the Canadian Supreme Court’ s 
decision, an Indian Income Tax Appellate Tribunal took 
the opportunity to elaborate on this issue. In the Demag 
Cranes case, the Tribunal explained that “the proposition 
that a number of individual transactions can be aggre-
gated and construed as a composite transaction in order 
to compute [the arm’ s length price] also finds an echo in 
the OECD guidelines under Chapter III […]”.145 In a more 
recent case, the Tribunal followed the rationale laid down 
in Demag Cranes. It again held that closely linked transac-
tions “can be aggregated and construed as a single trans-
action for the purpose of determining the arm’ s length 
price”.146
In other words, aggregation gives expression to the parties’ 
single composite transaction. Their composite transaction is 
delineated by applying a step-transaction analysis, which 
“treats a series of formally separate steps as a single trans-
action if the steps are in substance integrated, interde-
pendent, and focused toward a particular result”.147 This 
makes it possible to identify the true nature of the trans-
action (i.e. the commercial or financial relations) between 
the parties. As Lord Wilberforce reminded in the W T 
Ramsay Ltd. case, “[i]t is the task of the court to ascertain 
the legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought 
to attach a tax or a tax consequence and if that emerges 
from a series or combination of transactions, intended to 
operate as such, it is that series or combination which may 
be regarded”.148
What are the tax implications of aggregating separate con-
tracts into a single composite transaction? As the US Tax 
Court explained, “where an interrelated series of steps is 
taken pursuant to a plan to achieve an intended result, the 
tax consequences are to be determined not by viewing 
each step in isolation, but by considering all of them as an 
integrated whole”.149 Similarly, the US Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit explained:
Under the step transaction doctrine, “the tax consequences of 
an interrelated series of transactions are not to be determined 
by viewing each of them in isolation but by considering them 
together as component parts of an overall plan”. […] When con-
sidered individually, each step in the series may well escape taxa-
tion. The individual tax significance of each step is irrelevant, 
however, if the steps when viewed as a whole amount to a single 
144. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 17, at paras. 6.101 (emphasis 
added). See also para. 6.135. 
145. IN: ITAT (Pune), 31 Dec. 2012, Demag Cranes & Components (India) Pvt. 
Ltd. v. DCIT, ITA No. 1683/PN/2011, para. 30 (emphasis added). 
146. IN: ITAT (Pune), 31 Dec. 2014, Cummins India Ltd. v. ACIT, ITA No. 
1616/PN/2011, para. 26 (emphasis added), IBFD Tax Treaty Case Law. 
147. US: TC, 13 May 2010, Pierre v. Commissioner, TC Memo. 2010-106, at 6 
(emphasis added). See also US: CA (5th Cir.), 22 Oct. 1971, Crenshaw v. 
US, 450 F.2d 472, at 476 (5th Cir. 1971).
148. UK: HL, W T Ramsay Ltd v. IRC, (1981) STC 174 at 180, (1982) AC 300, 
at 322-324, cited in UK: Chancery Division, 2 Nov. 2000, Griffin (Inspector 
of Taxes) v. Citibank Investments Ltd, (2000) STC 1010, 73 TC 352, para. 
51.
149. US: Pierre (2010), at 6. See also US: Crenshaw (1971).
taxable transaction […] [Taxpayers] cannot compel a court to 
characterize the transaction solely upon the basis of a concentra-
tion on one facet of it when the totality of circumstances deter-
mines its tax status.150
Accordingly, a transfer pricing adjustment would be based 
on the combined effect of the series of linked contracts that 
made possible a single composite transaction, rather than 
making an adjustment based on the effects of each con-
tract (step) separately (i.e. a transaction-by-transaction 
approach). The central purpose of this step-transaction 
analysis is to ensure “that the tax consequences of a par-
ticular transaction turn on substance rather than form”.151
This understanding has also been expressed in domestic 
administrative guidance on transfer pricing. The Austra-
lian Taxation Office, for example, recognizes the possibility 
that the substance of the parties’ commercial or financial 
relations could be found in a single composite transac-
tion.152 In the United States, for the purpose of determin-
ing the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the US 
Regulations require taking into account the possible need 
to “aggregate” transactions. It states as follows:
[t]he combined effect of two or more separate transactions 
(whether before, during, or after the taxable year under review) 
may be considered, if such transactions, taken as a whole, are soin-
terrelated that consideration of multiple transactions is the most 
reliable means of determining the arm’ s length consideration for 
the controlled transactions.153
In its discussion of how to coordinate between interest 
adjustment requirements under different sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code, the US Regulations go on to state 
that it is first necessary to determine the substance of the 
transaction, and “for this purpose, all the relevant facts 
and circumstances shall be considered and any law or rule 
of law (assignment of income, step transaction, etc.) may 
apply”.154 The need for a step-transaction analysis is also 
alluded to in the recent IRS Notice 2014/58:
For purposes of determining whether the codified economic sub-
stance doctrine applies, “transaction” generally includes all the 
factual elements relevant to the expected tax treatment of any 
investment, entity, plan, or arrangement; and any or all of the steps 
that are carried out as part of a plan. Facts and circumstances deter-
mine whether a plan’ s steps are aggregated or disaggregated when 
defining a transaction.
Generally, when a plan that generated a tax benefit involves a series 
of interconnected steps with a common objective, the “transaction” 
includes all of the steps taken together – an aggregation approach. 
This means that every step in the series will be considered when 
analyzing whether the “transaction” as a whole lacks economic 
substance.155
150. US: CA (5th Cir.), 22 Apr. 1983, Security Industrial Insurance Co. v. US, 
702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1983).
151. Id., at 1245.
152. AU: ATO, Taxation Ruling TR 2014/6, Income Tax: Transfer Pricing: The 
Application of Section 815-130 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, para. 
109.
153. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(f)(2)(i)(A) (emphasis added). See also sec. 
1.482-1T(f)(2)(i)(B).
154. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-2(a)(3)(i).
155. US: IRS, Notice 2014-58, Additional Guidance under the Codified Economic 
Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties, IRB 2014-44, at 746 (emphasis 
added). This IRS Notice is relevant to the analysis in section 482 because 
the US Regulations require verification that the contractual terms are 
consistent with the economic substance of the underlying transactions. 
US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B).
Exported / Printed on 10 Feb. 2017 by IBFD.
190 INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING JOURNAL MAY/JUNE 2016 © IBFD
Amir Pichhadze
5.  The Authority To Aggregate
Notwithstanding the guidance provided by the OECD 
and by tax administrations, it is also pertinent and nec-
essary to inquire as to whether article 9(1) would apply 
to a single composite transaction that has been executed 
using separate but interrelated contracts (steps). As Wit-
tendorff explains, “for Article 9(1) to apply, conditions 
must be made or imposed ‘between’ associated enter-
prises concerning ‘their’ commercial or financial ‘relations’. 
According to its wording, Article 9(1) applies to direct rela-
tions between associated enterprises”.156 He goes on to note 
that “domestic law may provide that step transactions are 
to be treated as direct transactions between associated 
enterprises”;157 “[i]f, under domestic law, it is possible to 
treat a step transaction as a direct transaction between as-
sociated enterprises, Article 9(1) will apply”.158
Under domestic law, it may be possible to find references to 
the step-transaction analysis in statutory transfer pricing 
rules. This is typically achieved by having the legislature 
apply the rules to “a transaction or a series of transactions”, 
as exemplified by the current rules in the United Kingdom 
and Canada.159 The purpose of this notion of series:
is to identify situations where a particular transaction and one or 
more, usually tax-motivated, other transaction(s) are sufficiently 
integrated and related to be considered together, rather than on 
a transaction-by-transaction basis, in ascertaining the tax con-
sequences of the transactions.160
In OSFC Holdings Ltd., the Canadian Federal Court of 
Appeal accepted the inference that Parliament’ s statutory 
reference to a “series of transactions” is intended to apply 
the step-transaction doctrine.161
Section 69(2) of the Income Tax Act, under which Glaxo 
Canada was assessed in the Glaxo case, did not explicitly 
mention this notion of a “series of transactions”. As Tobin 
opined, “on its face” section 69(2) was focused “on spe-
cific payments for specific transactions and not transac-
tions as a whole”.162 Yet, neither did section 69(2) explicitly 
exclude its application to a series of transactions. There-
fore, it was arguably open for the Canadian Supreme Court 
to apply (or at least consider the option and/or need to 
apply) a step-transaction analysis as a judicial doctrine. 
This well-established doctrine has been applied to situ-
ations where separate transactions were “intended to have 
effect as part of a nexus or series of transactions”.163 A UK 
court explained that where a scheme (i.e. a series of trans-
actions) “amounted in practice to a single transaction, the 
156. Wittendorff, supra n. 97, at 233.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. In the United Kingdom, see UK: Taxation (International and Other Provi-
sions) Act 2010, secs. 147, 150. In Canada, see CA: Income Tax Act, sec. 
247(2).
160. M. Kandev, B. Bloom & O. Fournier, The Meaning of “Series of Transac-
tions” as Disclosed by a Unified Textual, Contextual, and Purposive Analysis, 
58 Can. Tax J. 2 (2010), at 308.
161. CA: FCA, 11 Sept. 2001, OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen, 2001 FCA 260, 
para. 23-24.
162. J.J. Tobin, Canada’ s Top Court Speaks on Transfer Pricing, Torys Tax Bul-
letin (19 Oct. 2012). 
163. UK: W T Ramsay Ltd.
court should look at the scheme as a whole”.164 Another UK 
court further stated that “the fiscal consequences of a pre-
ordained series of transactions, intended to operate as such, 
are generally to be ascertained by considering the result of 
the series as a whole, and not by dissecting the scheme and 
considering each individual transaction separately”.165 In 
other words, “where one finds transactions with a com-
mercial unity, they are to be taxed by reference to their 
combined effect”.166
This judicial doctrine has been applied in different con-
texts for the purpose of aggregating transactions. The US 
Tax Court has, for example, “applied the step transaction 
doctrine to aggregate a taxpayer’ s two separate same-day 
transfers in land to reflect the economic substance of the 
transaction”.167
Notably, the form and usage of this judicial doctrine 
varies around the world. For example, while it has been 
described as “well-established” and “expressly sanctioned” 
in the United States,168 it “did not gain much popularity” 
in Canada,169 although it has been applied in some Cana-
dian cases.170 Also, as explained in Appendix 2, there are 
different ways (tests) by which a step-transaction analysis 
could be applied – although each of these tests is said to be 
“faithful to the central purpose of the step transaction doc-
trine: ensuring that the tax consequences of a particular 
transaction turn on substance rather than form”.171 More-
over, some countries have developed alternative concepts 
that may apply to step transactions, such as the concept 
of “unnatural transactions” in some civil law countries.172
6.  Using Disaggregation as an Anti-Avoidance 
Measure
In some countries, such as Canada, the judicial step-trans-
action doctrine is used solely to delineate a single compos-
ite transaction so that tax can be based on the combined 
effect of the series of interrelated transactions, while in 
other countries, such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the doctrine is also used as an anti-avoidance 
measure against tax-motivated steps (i.e. contracts within 
the series). This anti-avoidance measure is achieved by 
applying a disaggregation approach.
Recall that, as the IRS recently explained in its Notice 
2014-58, in the United States the general rule is that all the 
interconnected steps within a series would be aggregated 
in order to determine their intended combined effect as 
164. UK: HL, 3 July 2003, Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Scottish Provident 
Institution, (2004), UKHL 52, para. 19.
165. UK: HL, 9 Feb. 1984, Furniss v. Dawson, (1984) AC 474, 512 (emphasis 
added).
166. UK: Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber, 27 July 2011, Schofield 
v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, (2011) STC 1920, (2011) UKUT 
306 (TCC), para. 74 (emphasis added). 
167. US: Pierre (2010), at 5.
168. Id.
169. W. Innes, P. Boyle & J. Nitikman, The Essential GAAR Manual: Policies, 
Principles and Procedures (CCH Canadian Ltd. 2006), at 21.
170. E.g. CA: SC, 7 Oct. 1970, Smythe et al. v. Minister of National Revenue, 
(1970) SCR 64; West Hill Redevelopment Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National 
Revenue, 69 DTC 5385 (Ex. Ct.).
171. US: Security Industrial Insurance Co. (1983), 1245.
172. Zimmer, supra n. 91, at 47.
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a single composite transaction.173 Yet, as the IRS goes on 
to explain:
when a series of steps includes a tax-motivated step that is not 
necessary to achieve a non-tax objective, an aggregation approach 
may not be appropriate. In that case, the “transaction” may include 
only the tax-motivated steps that are not necessary to accomplish 
the non-tax goals – a disaggregation approach.
Whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant and 
whether a transaction should be disaggregated will be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts and circum-
stances of each individual case. For example, if transfers of mul-
tiple assets and liabilities occur and the transfer of a specific asset 
or assumption of a specific liability was tax-motivated and unnec-
essary to accomplish a non-tax objective, then the economic sub-
stance doctrine may be applied solely to the transfer or assump-
tion of that specific asset or liability. Separable activities may take 
many forms including, for example, the use of an intermediary 
employed for tax benefits and whose actions or involvement 
was unnecessary to accomplish an overarching non-tax objec-
tive. These situations are merely examples intended to illustrate 
the potential application of the disaggregation approach and are 
not exhaustive or comprehensive.174
This disaggregation approach has also been expressed and 
applied by the courts in the United States. In the Smith case, 
for example, the US Tax Court explained that a step-trans-
action analysis “generally applies in cases where a taxpayer 
seeks to get from point A to point D and does so stopping 
in between at points B and C. The whole purpose of the 
unnecessary stops is to achieve tax consequences differing 
from those which a direct path from A to D would have 
produced”.175 The Court went on to explain that, in dealing 
with such schemes, “courts are not bound by the twisted 
path taken by the taxpayer, and the intervening stops may 
be disregarded or rearranged”.176
Turning to the United Kingdom, there the courts have set 
out a four-pronged test. As the House of Lords explained 
in Craven v. White:
As the law currently stands, the essentials emerging from Furniss 
v. Dawson, [1984] A.C. 474 appear to me to be four in number: 
(1) that the series of transactions was, at the time when the inter-
mediate transaction was entered into, pre-ordained in order to 
produce a given result; (2) that the transaction had no other pur-
pose than tax mitigation; (3) that there was at that time no practi-
cal likelihood that the pre-planned events would not take place in 
the order ordained, so that the intermediate transaction was not 
even contemplated practically as having an independent life, and 
(4) that the pre-ordained events did in fact take place.177
In Canadian Utilities Ltd., Justice Rothstein, of the Federal 
Court of Appeal, noted that the second and third factors 
in this test move beyond merely defining what constitutes 
a series of transactions. They also incorporate anti-avoid-
ance measures. In his words:
[52]  […] The four factors listed in Craven v. White do more than 
define a series.
173. US: IRS, Notice 2014-58.
174. Id. This IRS notice is relevant to the analysis under section 482 because 
it requires verification that the contractual terms are consistent with the 
economic substance of the underlying transactions. US Treas. Reg. sec. 
1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B).
175. US: TC, 1982, Smith v. Commissioner, 78 TC 350 (1982), at 389, aff’d 
without op., 820 F.3d 1220 (4th Cir. 1987).
176. US: Smith (1982), at 389.
177. UK: HL, 1989, Craven v. White, (1989) 1 AC 398 (H.L.), 514.
[53]  In England, the courts have created judicial anti-avoidance 
measures whereby they ignore the legal effects of otherwise 
valid transactions in certain circumstances. The Craven v. 
White factors are a common law code for determining not 
only whether a series exists, but also when the legal effect 
of an intermediate transaction in the series, which has no 
other purpose than tax avoidance and which is not intended 
to have any independent life, may be ignored.
[54]  In articulating his four-part test in Craven v. White, Lord Oli-
ver explained at 513-14 that the court in Furniss v. Dawson 
sought not only to treat a series of transactions as one com-
posite transaction, but also to ignore an intermediate trans-
action that would otherwise have to be given legal effect:
  ...the court was able to look at the overall transaction and to 
assess its legal result as a composite whole. But it was able to 
do this because it was in fact not only conceived but carried 
out as one indivisible transaction. However, that in itself was 
not enough, because if you merely did that you still ended 
up with the statutory fiscal results of an actual disposition 
by the Dawsons via Greenjacket to Wood Bastow and the 
price firmly locked in Greenjacket. You have to go one stage 
further and nullify the immediate transfer to Greenjacket 
which has its own permanent fiscal consequences unless it 
can be totally disregarded, for Ramsay merely “enables the 
courts to arrive at a conclusion which corresponds with the 
parties’ intentions”. In Furniss v. Dawson the parties’ inten-
tion was to produce a sale by Greenjacket instead of a sale by 
the Dawsons. So a further ingredient has to be supplied, and 
this is found in Burmah. This establishes the further propo-
sition that if you find in what, ex hypothesi, is an integrated 
and interdependent series of transactions a step inserted 
which has no other purpose than that of avoiding or mini-
mising a liability to tax which, without that step, would be 
attracted by the transactions, you are entitled for fiscal pur-
poses to ignore that step in assessing what is the true legal 
result of the series taken as a whole [emphasis in original].
[55]  Thus, the second and third parts of the test articulated 
by Lord Oliver are not concerned with when individual 
transactions are sufficiently connected that the court may 
consider them as having the composite effect they were 
intended to have. Rather, they are concerned with whether 
one transaction in that series was inserted solely for tax pur-
poses, and, as a matter of judicial anti-avoidance, should not 
be given what would otherwise be its legal effect.178
Turning to Canada, the Supreme Court affirmed that the 
starting point is the English common law test for deter-
mining whether there is a series (i.e. a single composite 
transaction), although this common law test is expanded 
by the definition of a “series of transactions” in section 
248(10) of the Income Tax Act.179 However, that Canadian 
law has not adopted the anti-avoidance elements from the 
English series test. As Justice Rothstein explained in the 
Canadian Utilities Ltd. case:
[56]  The Canadian approach is one of statutory rather than judi-
cial anti-avoidance measures. Thus, it would be inappro-
priate to import in its entirety a common law test which 
involves when the legal effect of a transaction may be 
ignored into the definition of series for Canadian tax pur-
poses.
[57]  Adoption of the House of Lords’ approach as described 
in OSFC means adoption of the pre-ordination test for 
determining whether a series of transactions exists at com-
mon law. It is only necessary to determine whether each 
of the transactions in the alleged series was preordained 
178. CA: FCA, 18 June 2004, Canada v. Canadian Utilities Ltd., 2004 FCA 234, 
paras. 52-55.
179. CA: SC, 16 Dec. 2011, Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2011 SCC 63.
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(as defined in OSFC) to produce a final result and whether 
those preordained transactions did in fact take place.
[58]  For these reasons, the trial judge should not have consid-
ered the second and third parts of the test set out in Craven 
v. White in determining whether the ATCOR/Forest series 
of transactions and the normal course dividends together 
constituted a common law series.180
7.  Implications of Aggregation and/or 
Disaggregation
7.1.  Whether aggregated or not, identifying the terms 
is a precondition for contractual interpretation
The starting point of contractual interpretation is the 
plain meaning of the words used by the parties within 
their terms,181 unless their terms need to be deduced from 
their conduct. This is true in both civil and common law 
systems, as well as at the international level.182 It is there-
fore not possible to properly interpret the terms – in order 
to identify the intentions of the parties and the true nature 
of their agreement – without first identifying the full scope 
of their terms. In the Glaxo case, for example, to determine 
whether Glaxo Canada intended to bundle payments, it 
was necessary to first identify the terms they agreed to, 
which may have been laid out in a single written contract 
(i.e. the supply agreement) or in a series of linked contracts 
(i.e. the supply and licence agreements) that together made 
possible a single composite transaction.
Recall that the Canadian Supreme Court left it to the Tax 
Court to determine whether the licence agreement was 
linked to the supply agreement. If it was, aggregation of 
terms could have been required.183 Yet, a retrial never took 
180. CA: Canadian Utilities Ltd. (2004).
181. In the United Kingdom, see UK: CD, 20 Dec. 2006, Ellse v. Hill-Pickford, 
[2006] EWHC 3293 (Ch), para. 23. In Canada, see CA: BCCA, 15 Jan. 
2010, Leggett & Platt Canada Co. v. Brink Forest Products Ltd., 2010 BCCA 
14, para. 21. In the United States, see US: CFC, 22 Jan. 2015, Allen v. US, 
119 Fed. Cl. 461, 478-479; US: CA (3rd Cir.), 5 Oct. 1999, Pacitti v. Macy’ s, 
193 F.3d 766, 773; US: CA (3rd Cir.), 29 Mar. 2011, Baldwin v. University 
of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 636 F.3d 69, 76. In Australia, see AU: FC, 9 
Nov. 2012, Visscher v. Teekay Shipping (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4), 2012 FCA 
1247, para. 120. 
182. I. Schwenzer, P. Hachem & C. Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012), at 295.
183. The Canadian Supreme Court appeared to suggest that aggregation was 
indeed justified and required in this case in order to determine the arm’ s 
length result based on the combined effect of the two contracts. For 
example, it stated that “[t]he combined effect of the Licence and Supply 
agreements enabled Glaxo Canada, among other things, to purchase 
ranitidine, put it in a delivery mechanism, and market it under the trade-
mark Zantac” (Glaxo (SCC), para. 8). “The result of the price paid was to 
allocate to Glaxo Canada what Glaxo Group considered to be appropriate 
compensation for its secondary manufacturing and marketing function 
in respect of ranitidine and Zantac” (Glaxo (SCC), para. 49).
 Similarly, at the hearing before the Supreme Court, Madam Justice Des-
champs commented that “if you are looking at the transaction with the 
generic companies, you are not looking at the same transaction; you are 
not looking at people who will purchase to resell as Zantac”. (Glaxo (SCC), 
Transcript of Hearing, supra n. 129, at 17). Ms. Burnham, Counsel for 
the Minister, replied: “That is not the transaction. The transaction is a 
simple purchase of ranitidine” (Glaxo (SCC), Transcript of Hearing, supra 
n. 129, at 17). At another point, Madam Justice Abella inquired about 
Glaxo Canada’ s assertion that Glaxo Group was to receive 40% of its dis-
tributors’ retail price. Ms. Burnham replied as follows: “But the problem 
with the analysis that you are doing is that you are looking at the whole 
deal” (Glaxo (SCC), Transcript of Hearing, supra n. 129, at 11 (emphasis 
added)). Subsequently, Madam Justice Abella replied: “That is what ‘in 
the circumstances’ might suggest, ‘in the circumstances’?” (Glaxo (SCC), 
Transcript of Hearing, supra n. 129, at 11).
place, and therefore the scope of the terms was not deter-
mined by the courts.
Nevertheless, in its analysis the Supreme Court concluded 
that Glaxo Canada appears to have intended to bundle 
payments for the raw materials received from Adechsa and 
“at least some of the rights and benefits under the Licence 
Agreement”.184 Respectfully, in the author’ s opinion, 
without having established the scope of the terms which 
had to be construed, the Court was not in a proper posi-
tion to draw this conclusion about the intentions of Glaxo 
Canada.
7.2.  The contents of the terms could affect the outcome 
of contractual interpretation
The scope and contents of the terms could have a pivotal 
role in the outcome of interpretation. In the Glaxo case, for 
example, if the terms of the licence agreement were indeed 
a part of a single composite transaction, they could have 
been determinative in delineating the intentions of the 
parties. Yet, this is not explicitly revealed by the Canadian 
Supreme Court’ s reasons for judgment. This is not sur-
prising, considering that the Court did not even mention 
if and how it construed the terms of the transaction.
Nevertheless, to explain how the scope and contents of the 
terms could have affected the outcome of interpretation in 
this case, it is possible to apply contractual interpretation 
principles to two hypothetical scenarios. The first scenario 
requires assuming that the terms were confined to those 
expressed within the four corners of the supply agreement. 
The second scenario requires assuming that the terms of 
the supply and licence agreement needed to be aggregated 
to reflect the parties’ single composite transaction.
Considering that the courts in this case did not indicate 
which source of law governed the contractual interpreta-
tion of the supply and licence agreements, for both sce-
narios it is also assumed that Canadian common law gov-
erned the interpretation of these contracts. The pertinent 
principles of interpretation are summarized below, and are 
then applied to the transaction in both scenarios.
7.2.1.  Canadian common law principles of contractual 
interpretation: A summary
Recall that tax is based on the effects of contract(s), and the 
effects of contracts ought to be based on the true nature 
of the agreement of the parties,185 as it was intended by 
the parties.186 Contractual intentions ought to be delin-
eated objectively187 from the terms the parties agreed to, 
as they were expressed (in writing or orally) and/or as 
they could be implied from their words and/or conduct. 
184. Glaxo (SCC), paras. 51-52.
185. CA: Richmond (2007), para. 33.
186. CA: Sattva Capital Corp. (2014), para. 47; CA: Invesco (2004), para. 41; 
CA: Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin (1996); CA: Royal Winnipeg Ballet 
(2006), para. 59. CA: Poulin (2003), para. 27; CA: Le Livreur Plus Inc. 
(2004), para.17; CA: Continental Bank Leasing Corp. (1996), para. 19.
187. CA: BCCA, 28 Jan. 2000, Gilchrist v. Western Star Trucks Inc., 2000 BCCA 
70, para. 17.
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Regardless of whether the relevant terms are ambiguous,188 
their meaning189 ought to be ascertained in light of their 
total context, which includes all the terms in the agree-
ment (i.e. the contract’ s internal context),190 as well as rel-
evant surrounding circumstances (i.e. the contract’ s exter-
nal context).191If the terms are ambiguous, a court should 
apply a commercially sensible interpretation.192 Extrinsic 
evidence of subjective intentions, which were not con-
veyed by the parties in their terms, must not be relied on 
as evidence of the intentions of the parties,193 unless doing 
so is necessary to resolve latent ambiguity in the terms.194
7.2.2.  Scenario 1: Interpretation of a “single transaction”
In this scenario, it is necessary to distil Glaxo Canada’ s 
intentions from within the terms in the four corners of 
the supply agreement, as understood in light of its total 
context (i.e. the agreement as a whole as well as the agree-
ment’ s surrounding circumstances). In such a case, Glaxo 
Canada’ s commercial purpose and the licence agreement 
would expectedly be relevant circumstances that ought to 
have been admissible for the purpose of shedding light on 
the meaning of the terms. However, that extrinsic evidence 
could not be relied on to reveal Glaxo Canada’ s inten-
tion to bundle payments, unless the terms were latently 
ambiguous. If the terms of the supply agreement clearly 
and unambiguously conveyed an intention to pay for only 
the goods/services provided under the terms of the supply 
agreement, it is that intention that should have been given 
effect, even if the result would appear to be commercially 
unreasonable.
Presumably, the expressed terms of the supply agree-
ment did not convey an intention to bundle payments.195 
Moreover, as pointed out elsewhere, it is doubtful whether 
188. CA: NFCA, 7 Apr. 2000, Eco-Zone Engineering Ltd. v. Grand Falls-Wind-
sor (Town), 2000 NFCA 21, para. 10; CA: MBCA, 27 Sept. 2011, King v. 
Operating Engineers Training Institute of Manitoba Inc., 2011 MBCA 80, 
para. 66; CA: ONCA, 31 Jan. 2007, Dumbrell v. The Regional Group of 
Companies Inc., 2007 ONCA 59, para. 54.
189. CA: SC, 9 July 1998, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., (1998) 2 SCR 129, 
para. 54.
190. CA: ACQB, 17 June 1987, Qualico Developments Ltd. v. Calgary (City), 
1987 3390 (AB QB), para. 39; CA: ABCA, 7 June 2004, ATCO Electric 
Limited v. Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), (2004) ABCA 215, para. 77, 
accessible via http://canlii.ca/t/1hgfc (accessed 5 April 2016); CA: ONCA, 
14 Oct. 2010, Salah v. Timothy’ s Coffees of the World Inc., (2010) OJ 4336 
(C.A.), para. 26. 
191. CA: Sattva Capital Corp. (2014), para. 47. The Canadian Supreme Court 
went on to explain that “the nature of the evidence that can be relied upon 
under the rubric of ‘surrounding circumstances’ will necessarily vary from 
case to case. It does, however, have its limits. It should consist only of 
objective evidence of the background facts at the time of the execution 
of the contract (King v. Operating Engineers Training Institute of Manitoba 
Inc., 2011 MBCA 80, paras. 66, 70), that is, knowledge that was or reason-
ably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before 
the date of contracting” (CA: Sattva Capital Corp. (2014), para. 58).
192. CA: SC, 21 Dec. 1979, Consolidated-Bathurst v. Mutual Boiler & Machinery 
Insurance Co., (1980) 1 SCR 888, at 901. However, if the terms are unam-
biguous then commercial reasonableness would not be a determinative 
factor in interpretation (CA: Eli Lilly & Co. (1998), para. 56).
193. CA: ABQB, 17 Aug. 2012, Alberta Oil Sands Pipeline Ltd. v. Canadian Oil 
Sands Ltd., 2012 ABQB 524, para. 31; Excelsior Properties Ltd. v. Cosentino 
Developments Inc, 2012 ABQB 482, para. 36.
194. CA: ONCA Ontario High Court, 29 Nov. 1968, Leitch Gold Mines Ltd. v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., (1969) 1 OR 469, para. 243.
195. If such an intention was explicitly expressed, the issue should not have 
been contentious in this case.
Glaxo Canada would have been able to establish the need 
to imply an intention to bundle payments.196
Neither party in this dispute, nor the courts, suggested 
that the terms of the supply agreement were ambiguous. 
Therefore, the commercial reasonableness of bundling 
payments should not have been determinative, and effect 
would have to be given to the intentions of the parties as 
objectively delineated from their terms.
If indeed the terms were unambiguous, extrinsic evidence, 
for the purpose of revealing the subjective intention of the 
parties to bundle payments, should not have been admissi-
ble. Nevertheless, based on the extrinsic evidence of Glaxo 
Canada’ s economic and business reality (which, again, in-
cluded the commercial purpose to manufacture and sell 
the Zantac brand, as well as the need to enter into both 
the licence and supply agreements in order to achieve 
that purpose),197 the Supreme Court concluded that, as it 
appears, Glaxo Canada intended to bundle payments for 
the goods/services/rights received under both the licence 
and supply agreements. There is real risk that this con-
clusion amounted to an error of law.198 It is therefore sug-
gested that the Court should consider overruling its deci-
sion in this case.199
7.2.3.  Scenario 2: Interpretation of a “single composite 
transaction”
In this scenario, the terms of the licence agreement would 
not be mere surrounding circumstances. Rather, these 
terms, in their aggregated form, would provide admis-
sible evidence of the subjective intentions of the parties. 
This could have revealed an intention to bundle payments. 
Thus, had the Canadian Supreme Court actually reached a 
conclusion that the terms were so closely linked (so closely 
intertwined) that they had to be aggregated to form a single 
composite transaction, an interpretation of the terms in 
that composite transaction could then possibly reveal 
Glaxo Canada’ s intention to bundle payments.
196. Pichhadze, supra n. 45, at 162-163.
197. Glaxo (SCC), paras. 15, 45.
198. See e.g. CA: FCA, 21 Apr. 2008, General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. The 
Queen, 2008 FCA 142, para. 42.
199. In Craig v. The Queen (CA: SC, 1 Aug. 2012, 2012 SCC 43), the Canadian 
Supreme Court was faced with the delicate question as to whether to 
overrule its prior decision. Not surprisingly, the Court stated that such a 
move should not be undertaken lightly (para. 24), and that such a deci-
sion has been carried out in only a limited number of cases. Neverthe-
less, the Court’ s power and willingness to overrule its prior decision is 
firmly established. For example in The Queen v. Salituro (CA: SC, 28 Nov. 
1991, (1991) 3 SCR 654, para. 29), the Court stated that “[t]his court is 
now willing, where there are compelling reasons for doing so, to over-
turn its own previous decisions [...]: Stuart v. Bank of Montreal (1909), 41 
SCR 516”. Similarly, in Ranville, the Court stated that “[t]he traditional 
justification for the stare decisis principle is certainty in the law. This of 
course remains an important consideration even though this Court has 
announced its willingness, for compelling reasons, to overturn a prior 
decision” (CA: SC, 28 Sept. 1982, Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs & 
Northern Development) v. Ranville (1982) 2 SCR 518, para. 15 (emphasis 
added)). 
 Turning back to Craig, the Court explained that when considering whether 
to overrule its prior decision, the Supreme Court “must ask whether it is 
preferable to adhere to an incorrect precedent to maintain certainty, or 
to correct the error” (CA: Craig (2012), para. 27). It was emphasized that 
“the Court must be satisfied based on compelling reasons that the prec-
edent was wrongly decided and should be overruled” (para. 25).
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7.3.  The outcome of interpretation affects the search 
for arm’ s length comparables
The search for an arm’ s length comparable is based on 
the delineated transaction, be it a single or a composite 
transaction. In the Glaxo case, for example, if the terms 
were confined to those within the supply agreement, and 
an interpretation of those terms revealed an intention to 
pay for the ranitidine and nothing more, then the arm’ s 
length comparable would need to reflect the same inten-
tion. In such a case, arguably the Minister’ s proposed arm’ s 
length purchases of the generic ranitidine may have been 
comparable,200 as Apotex and Novopharm were similarly 
paying for the equivalent raw material and nothing more. 
Conversely, if the terms had to be aggregated in order to 
reflect a single composite transact, and an interpretation 
of the aggregated terms revealed and intention to bundle 
payments, then the arm’ s length comparable would need 
to reflect the same intention.
8.  Conclusion: Necessary Next Steps
Both the OECD Guidelines and domestic 
administrative guidance on transfer pricing ought to 
clarify, more explicitly, that the task of aggregation 
requires applying a step-transaction analysis in order 
to delineate the terms of the parties’ single composite 
transaction, and to then apply the relevant tax rule(s) 
based on the combined effect of the interrelated 
contracts. As for domestic courts, if domestic 
legislation has not already adopted the notion of a 
series of transactions, they should consider applying 
the step-transaction analysis as a judicial doctrine 
when aggregating interrelated transactions.
200. The Canadian Supreme Court concluded that the arm’ s length purchases 
relied on by the Minister were not comparable because “the generic com-
parators do not reflect the economic and business reality of Glaxo Canada 
and, at least without adjustment, do not indicate the price that would be 
reasonable in the circumstances, had Glaxo Canada and Adechsa been 
dealing at arm’ s length” (Glaxo (SCC), para. 53). The problem is that with 
this approach, the Supreme Court appears to give greater weight to Glaxo 
Canada’ s economic and business reality, and less (or no) weight to Glaxo 
Canada’ s objectively conveyed contractual intentions in the supply agree-
ment. If so, one should bear in mind that “[t]he words of the contract must 
not be overwhelmed by a contextual analysis, otherwise there is little point 
in writing things down. No certainty could be achieved in choosing words 
to express a bargain” (CA: BCCA, Black Swan Gold Mines Ltd. v. Goldbelt 
Resources Ltd., (1996) 78 BCAC 193, para. 19). See also CA: Sattva Capital 
Corp. (2014), para. 57; CA: BCCA, 4 Aug. 2004, Kingsway General Insur-
ance Co. v. Lougheed Enterprises Ltd., 2004 BCCA 421, at para.10; CA: 
BCCA, 2 Nov. 2009, Perrin v. Shortreed Joint Venture Ltd., 2009 BCCA 
478, at paras.23-27.
 Also notable is the critique by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal that 
“failing to consider that Agreement meant that the Judge made his deter-
mination in a fictitious business world where a purchaser is able to pur-
chase ranitidine at a price which does not take into account the circum-
stances which make it possible for that purchaser to obtain the rights to 
make and sell Zantac” (Glaxo (FCA), para. 78). This appears to assume 
that Glaxo Canada’ s contractual intentions were to pay consideration for 
the right to make and sell Zantac. Recall that such an intention might not 
have been objectively revealed by the terms of the supply agreement in 
the first scenario, although it may have been revealed from the aggregated 
terms in the second scenario.
9.  Appendix
9.1.  Appendix 1: The internationally coordinated 
response to the transfer pricing problem:  
An overview
9.1.1.  The transfer pricing problem
In our era of economic globalization, the world has wit-
nessed the proliferation of cross-border trade in goods 
and services; the cross-border flow of capital and labour; 
and the cross-border transfer of production facilities and 
technology.201 Notwithstanding the benefits of globaliza-
tion to domestic economies202 and to businesses,203 these 
developments have also heightened the risk of national 
tax base erosion.
Preventing tax base erosion is said to have become “a key 
priority of governments around the world”.204 This is not 
surprising in the aftermath of the recent global economic 
crisis in 2008, which placed heavier burdens on govern-
ments’ budgets205 and has attracted increased political and 
public attention on cross-border tax avoidance schemes by 
multinational enterprises.206
As Ault, Schoen and Shay recently explained,207 there are 
two sides that contribute to this problem: (i) the behav-
iour of states and (ii) the behaviour of businesses (particu-
larly multinational enterprises) that are engaged in inter-
national (cross-border) activities.
9.1.1.1.  One side of the coin: States have created an 
environment which gives the incentive for, and 
makes possible, tax arbitrage
States attempt to boost their economy by competing to 
attract and retain the cross-border flow of productive 
resources. They compete by providing businesses with 
attractive fiscal conditions. As the OECD explains:
the wave of tax reform that has swept through OECD and other 
countries over the last 15 years has been driven in part by the 
desire to achieve this goal. Personal and corporate income tax 
rates have been significantly reduced, particularly in Europe, and 
the tax base has been widened to remove many tax-induced dis-
tortions.208
201. OECD,Globalisation and Regional Economies: Can OECD Regions Compete 
in Global Industries?, OECD Reviews of Regional Innovation (OECD 
2007), at 61.
202. As the OECD acknowledges, “[g]lobalisation has boosted trade and in-
creased foreign direct investments in many countries. Hence it supports 
growth, creates jobs, fosters innovation, and has lifted millions out of 
poverty” (OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 
2013), at 7, International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD).
203. Global business models can make it possible for businesses to better maxi-
mize profits and minimize expenses and costs.
204. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 34, at 3.
205. Government budgets have had to address different pressure points such 
as corporate bail-outs and rising unemployment.
206. N. Feetham, Tax Arbitrage: The Trawling of the International Tax System 
(Spiramus Press Ltd. 2011); Revitalising International Taxation, OECD 
Observer 295 (Q2 2013).
207. H.J. Ault, W. Schön & S.E. Shay, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Roadmap 
for Reform, 68 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 6/7 (2014), at 275, 276, Journals IBFD.
208. Ctr. for Tax Policy & Admin., The OECD’ s Project on Harmful Tax Prac-
tices: 2006 Update on Progress in Member Countries (OECD 2006), at 2, 
para. 2., available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/37446434.pdf.
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This competition gets problematic once the practices used 
by states become harmful. As the G7 countries declared 
in 1996:
globalisation is creating new challenges in the field of tax policy. 
Tax schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographi-
cally mobile activities can create harmful tax competition between 
States, carrying the risks of distorting trade and investment and 
could lead to the erosion of national tax bases.209
In this competitive environment, tax rates are not the only 
tool used by states. States also compete by offering attrac-
tive legal conditions, particularly through their domestic 
tax rules. Perhaps inevitably, this leads to gaps and diver-
gences between domestic tax laws.
The taxation of cross-border transactions is further com-
plicated by the use of additional layers of legal and non-
legal instruments. These include other sources of binding 
“hard law”, such as bilateral and multilateral tax treaties;210 
customary international laws;211 and non-binding “soft 
law” instruments, such as internationally coordinated 
guidelines. It has thus been said that “legal pluralism is 
intrinsic to cross-border taxation”.212
Having cross-border taxation governed by a pluralistic 
legal system can have significant implications. As Tama-
naha explains:
What makes this pluralism noteworthy is not merely the fact that 
there are multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bod-
ies of law, but that there is diversity amongst them. They may 
make competing claims of authority; they may impose conflicting 
demands or norms; they may have different styles and orienta-
tions. This potential conflict can generate uncertainty or jeop-
ardy for individuals and groups in society who cannot be sure 
209. G7/8 1996 Lyon Summit (28 June 1996), Economic Communiqué: Making 
a Success of Globalization for the Benefit of All, para. 16 (emphasis added). 
See http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1996lyon/communique.
html. 
210. As Pistone explains, “unlike other international treaties, tax treaties face 
legal pluralism as a natural condition for their application, since Art. 3.2 
of the OECD Model allows characterization based on the domestic law 
of either contracting state for terms not defined by the treaty, unless the 
context otherwise requires. This is possibly a necessary consequence of 
the absence of an international tax court and need to secure effective ap-
plication of limits on the exercise of taxing powers in the national juris-
diction of each contracting state” (P. Pistone, Soft Tax Law: Steering Legal 
Pluralism towards International Tax Coordination, in Traditional and Alter-
native Routes to European Tax Integration: Primary Law, Secondary Law, 
Soft Law, Coordination, Comitology and Their Relationship (D. Weber ed., 
IBFD 2010), at 100, Online Books IBFD).
211. As Christians explains, “unlike treaty law, customary law emerges not from 
formal documentation but from state practice, pronouncements made by 
international bodies, and other informal processes” (A. Christians, Hard 
Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 Wisc. Intl. L. J. 2 (2007), 
footnote 18). She goes on to explain that “customary law is characterized 
by two fundamental elements: states uniformly comply with it […], and 
they do so out of a sense of legal obligation […]” (Christians, at 329). It 
has been argued, for example, that the arm’ s length standard, which is used 
internationally as the basis for conducting the transfer pricing analysis, 
is a form of customary international law. See R. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competi-
tion, Tax Arbitrage, and the International Tax Regime, 61 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 
4 (2007), at 130, Journals IBFD; B. Lepard, Is the United States Obligated 
to Drive on the Right? A Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the Normative Au-
thority of Contemporary International Law Using the Arm’ s Length Standard 
as a Case Study, 10 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 43 (1999-2000), at 167-175.
212. Pistone, supra n. 210, at 99. The concept of legal pluralism has been a topic 
of rich academic debate. See e.g. B. Dupret, Legal Pluralism, Plurality of 
Laws, and Legal Practices: Theories, Critiques, and Praxiological Re-spec-
ification, 1 Eur. J. Legal Studies 1 (2007), at 1; F. von Benda-Beckmann, 
Who’ s Afraid of Legal Pluralism, available at http://commission-on-legal-
pluralism.com/volumes/47/Bendabeckmann-art.pdf.
in advance which legal regime will be applied to their situation. 
This state of conflict also creates opportunities for individuals and 
groups within society, who can opportunistically select from among 
coexisting legal authorities to advance their aims.213
The competition between states to establish attractive 
fiscal and legal environments has created ripe conditions 
for legal arbitrage. That is, differences between the domes-
tic tax laws among countries have created the incentives 
and opportunities for tax arbitrage.214
9.1.1.2.  The other side of the coin: Multinational enterprises 
take advantage of legal arbitrage through aggressive 
tax planning schemes
Perhaps not surprisingly, multinational enterprises have 
been exploiting this opportunity of tax arbitrage by devis-
ing aggressive tax planning schemes. Two key factors make 
these enterprises particularly well suited to devise and 
implement such schemes. First, they operate under con-
ditions of common control, which gives them greater flexi-
bility in how they structure intra-firm transactions (i.e. the 
“commercial or financial relations” between members of 
the same multinational enterprise), as compared to busi-
nesses that trade at arm’ s length.215 As the OECD explains:
Associated enterprises are able to make a much greater variety 
of contracts and arrangements than can independent enter-
prises because the normal conflict of interest which would exist 
between independent parties is often absent. Associated enter-
prises may and frequently do conclude arrangements of a spe-
cific nature that are not or are very rarely encountered between 
independent parties. This may be done for various economic, 
legal, or fiscal reasons dependent on the circumstances in a par-
ticular case. Moreover, contracts within an MNE could be quite 
easily altered, suspended, extended, or terminated according to 
the overall strategies of the MNE as a whole, and such alterations 
may even be made retroactively.216
213. B.Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to 
Global, 30 Sydney L. Rev. (2008), at 375 (emphasis added).
214. Tax arbitrage refers to “transactions that are designed to take advantage of 
differences between national tax systems to achieve double non-taxation” 
(Avi-Yonah, supra n. 211, at 137).
215. As the OECD explains, “when independent enterprises transact with each 
other the conditions of their commercial and financial relations (e.g. the 
price of goods transferred or services provided and the conditions of the 
transfer or provision) ordinarily are determined by market forces” (OECD 
Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, para. 1.2). Presumably, in such arm’ s length 
transactions neither party controls the decision making of the other and 
each party negotiates the price of the transaction with its self-interests in 
mind. According to an affidavit submitted to the Federal Court of Austra-
lia, “the buyer attempts to pay as little as possible and the seller attempts to 
extract as high a price as possible – with the ultimate price largely deter-
mined by the positions/bargaining power of the two parties” (AU: Affi-
davit of Brian C. Becker, submitted for SNF (Australia) PTY Ltd v. Com-
missioner of Taxation, Federal Court of Australia, (Mar. 2009), at 19).
 The OECD goes on to explain that, in contrast, “[w]hen associated enter-
prises transact with each other their commercial and financial relations 
may not be directly affected by external market forces in the same way 
[…]” (OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, para. 1.2). This is due to their 
conditions of control. That is, either one party to the transaction controls 
the other (e.g. a parent company controls its subsidiary), or both parties 
are controlled by the same entity (e.g. two subsidiaries with a common 
parent company). This control makes it possible for the parties in a con-
tract to pursue common objectives, as opposed to dealing as separate 
entities, each with its own interests in mind.
216. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 1.67.
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Second, unlike businesses that trade mainly within their 
national market,217 multinational enterprises have a pres-
ence in multiple jurisdictions which makes possible cross-
border, intra-firm transactions.
The differences in domestic tax rules may create the con-
ditions and incentives for planning intra-firm, cross-
border transactions in ways that exploit “legal arbitrage 
opportunities and the boundaries of acceptable tax plan-
ning […]”.218 For example, a multinational enterprise can 
flexibly structure the conditions of its intra-firm transac-
tions in ways that ultimately result in shifting its income to 
jurisdictions that have more favourable tax rates, thereby 
avoiding taxes either partially or completely. As Baistroc-
chi explains:
[I]f the effective tax rate of the manufacturer’ s jurisdiction is 
higher than that of its subsidiary, then the manufacturer can 
charge the lowest possible transfer price to its subsidiary in order 
to channel the profits of the MNE to the lowest tax jurisdiction. 
Conversely, if the manufacturer’ s effective tax rate is lower than 
that of its subsidiary, the manufacturer can charge the highest 
possible price to its subsidiary. The net effect of this transfer pri-
cing strategy is to increase the after-tax profit of the MNE.219
9.1.1.3.  The risk of tax base erosion
The OECD Guidelines state that “[t]ransfer prices [...] 
determine in large part the income and expenses, and 
therefore taxable profits, of associated enterprises in dif-
ferent tax jurisdictions”.220 For example:
New Zealand taxes all persons on their income sourced in New 
Zealand, which means exercising its jurisdiction to tax foreign-
based multinationals on profits attributable to their New Zealand 
operations. These profits, in theory, are expected to be commen-
surate with the economic contribution made (including commer-
cial risk borne) by those New Zealand operations.221
As the New Zealand Internal Revenue Department 
explains, “[the] transfer price [as] adopted by a multina-
tional determines where the profits of that multinational 
are sourced. Consequently, it also determines whether tax 
is imposed on the amount of income truly attributable to 
each jurisdiction in which the multinational operates”.222 
The Internal Revenue Department further explains:
If a non-market value (inadequate or excessive consideration) 
is paid for the transfer of goods, services, intangible property or 
loans between those members, the income calculated for each of 
those members will be inconsistent with their relative economic 
contributions. This distortion will flow through to the tax rev-
enues of their host countries.223
217. As Love explains, “[s]mall businesses, businesses working mainly in one 
national market and new firms can’t compete with MNEs who shift profits 
across borders to avoid or reduce tax” (P. Love, What is BEPS and How 
Can You Stop It?, OECD Insights (19 July 2013)).
218. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra n. 202, at 8.
219. Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes: A Global Analysis (E. Baistrocchi & 
I. Roxan eds., Cambridge University Press 2012), at 11.
220. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at Preface, para. 12.
221. NZ: Inland Revenue Dept., 12(10) IRD Tax Information Bulletin (Oct. 
2000), Appendix: Transfer Pricing Guidelines, at 9, available at http://www.
ird.govt.nz/resources/7/c/7c6c6b8d-5b2e-4409-87ce-541ca82b7548/
tib-vol12-no10-appendix.pdf.
222. NZ: Inland Revenue Dept., supra n. 221, at 10.
223. Id., at 9.
Considering the risk of tax base erosion, New Zealand, 
similar to other states, shares an interest of ensuring 
“that the proper amount of income is attributed to its 
jurisdiction”.224 The New Zealand’ s transfer pricing rules, 
similar to the equivalent rules in other states, “are intended 
to measure the amount of income and expenditure of a 
multinational properly attributable to its New Zealand 
operation”.225 As was explained by the Canadian Tax Court:
[t]he underlying policy concern behind the transfer pricing rules 
is, of course, leakage from the Federal Treasury due to profits 
being shifted from one country to another or, expressed in more 
conventional terms, the object is to ensure that parties not at arm’ s 
length report substantially the same amount of income in the 
jurisdiction in which they are located as would parties dealing 
at arm’ s length.226
This risk of tax base erosion is particularly significant 
considering that “MNEs are responsible for two-thirds of 
global trade and 80% of investment”,227 and consequently 
transfer pricing schemes can result in a substantial loss (for 
states) of otherwise taxable revenue. It has been found that 
multinational enterprises can reduce their tax burden by 
anywhere from 3% to 22%.228
9.1.2.  An internationally coordinated response
9.1.2.1.  The arm’ s length principle: A coordinated standard 
for income allocation
It is commonplace for states to use domestic rules to 
combat aggressive transfer pricing schemes. Yet, if each 
state that is affected by the same cross-border transaction 
were to apply different and inconsistent approaches to 
determining income allocation and deductions, the risk 
could arise that the parties will be subject to double taxa-
tion (i.e. the same income will be included in the tax base 
of the different jurisdictions involved).
To reduce this risk of double taxation, states have been 
relying on an internationally coordinated common stan-
dard for determining income allocation in controlled 
transactions.229 The US Regulations under section 482 of 
the Internal Revenue Code refer to this as the arm’ s length 
standard,230 while the OECD Guidelines refer to this as 
the arm’ s length principle.231 Coordination of this stan-
dard has been achieved by incorporating it into bilateral 
tax treaties.232
224. Id., at 10.
225. Id., at 9.
226. CA: Alberta Printed Circuits Ltd. (2010), para. 152.
227. OECD, Globalisation and Regional Economies, supra n. 201, at 63.
228. D.R. Harris, R. Morck, J. Slemrod & B. Yeung, Income Shifting in US Multi-
national Corporations, in Studies in International Taxation (A. Giovannini, 
R. Hubbard & J. Slemrod eds., University of Chicago Press 1993), cited in 
S. Basu, Global Perspectives on E-Commerce Taxation Law (Ashgate Pub-
lishing 2007), at 135.
229. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at Preface, paras. 6-7, 15-16; SG: 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra n. 10, at para. 5.7.
230. US Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(b)(1). US: TC, 13 Nov. 1989, Paccar, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 85 TC 754, 787 (TC 1985).
231. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at 31.
232. It has been estimated that there are more than 2,500 bilateral tax treaties 
worldwide (Z.D. Altman, Dispute Resolution Under Tax Treaties (IBFD 
2005), at 1, Online Books IBFD). 
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Treaties typically adopt the standard as it is formulated in 
article 9 of the model tax treaties.233 Under article 9(1) of 
the OECD Model,234 for example, if the conditions235 in the 
actual controlled transaction differ236 to those which would 
be agreed in an uncontrolled transaction under comparable 
circumstances,237 the profits (i.e. income allocation) in the 
actual controlled transaction could be adjusted to reflect 
the allocation that would have resulted in the comparable 
uncontrolled transaction.
This analysis aims to identify uncontrolled transaction(s) 
which, while being comparable in character and circum-
stances, were (in fact) not (or hypothetically are presumed 
not to have been) subject to the special (non-arm’ s length) 
conditions that may have affected income allocation in the 
controlled transaction. The aim is to eliminate the effect of 
these special conditions on income allocation in the con-
trolled transaction.238 The OECD Guidelines further state 
that “OECD member countries consider that an appropri-
ate adjustment is achieved by establishing the conditions 
of the commercial and financial relations that they would 
expect to find between independent enterprises in com-
parable transactions under comparable circumstances”.239
As explained in the United Nations Practical Manual on 
Transfer Pricing (the UN Manual):
1.7.1  […] Article 9 is not “self-executing” as to domestic applic-
ation – it does not create a transfer pricing regime in a coun-
try where such a regime does not already exist.
1.7.2  It should be recognized that transfer pricing regimes are 
creatures of domestic law and each country is required to 
formulate detailed domestic legislation to implement trans-
233. Model tax treaties include the OECD Model Convention on Income and 
on Capital, which focuses on treaties between developed countries; the 
UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Devel-
oping Countries; and the US Model Income Tax Convention. Each of 
these models contains an article 9, which deals with associated enterprises 
and sets out the arm’ s length standard. As the US Internal Revenue Service 
noted in its Notice 88-123, the OECD, UN, and US Models are essentially 
the same with regard to article 9 (US: Treasury Department and Internal 
Revenue Service, Notice 88-123: A Study of Intercompany Pricing under 
Section 482 of the Code, 1988-2 CB 458, 475).
234. OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra n. 12, at 29-30. The text of article 
9(1) is set out in Appendix 3 (section 9.3.) of this article.
235. Conditions could be, for example, “the price of goods transferred or ser-
vices provided and the conditions of the transfer or provision” (OECD 
Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 1.2). Additional examples of condi-
tions may be “payment terms” or “allocation of risks” (OECD Guidelines 
(2010), supra n. 2, at para. 9.165). According to the OECD Guidelines, 
“where independent enterprises seldom undertake transactions of the 
type entered into by associated enterprises, the arm’ s length principle is 
difficult to apply because there is little or no direct evidence of what con-
ditions would have been established by independent enterprises” (OECD 
Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at para. 1.11).
236. Conditions might differ because, for example, while they might be affected 
by market forces when the parties deal with one another at arm’ s length, 
“when associated enterprises transact with each other, their commercial 
and financial relations may not be directly affected by external market 
forces in the same way [...]. When transfer pricing does not reflect market 
forces and the arm’ s length principle, the tax liabilities of the associated 
enterprises and the tax revenues of the host countries could be distorted” 
(OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at paras. 1.2-1.3).
237. This could “be either a comparable transaction between one party to the 
controlled transaction and an independent party (‘internal comparable’) 
or between two independent enterprises, neither of which is a party to the 
controlled transaction (‘external comparable’)” (OECD Guidelines (2010), 
supra n. 2, para. 3.24).
238. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 2, at Preface, para. 6.
239. Id., at para. 1.3.
fer pricing rules. Many countries have passed such domestic 
transfer pricing legislation which typically tends to limit the 
application of transfer pricing rules to cross-border related 
party transactions only.240
Thus, the arm’ s length standard is given domestic effect 
by having legislatures incorporate it into their domes-
tic tax law,241 although there are variations in how coun-
tries have gone about doing so.242 In Canada, for example, 
“[p]aragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c), like former subsection 
69(2), is analogous to Article 9(1) of the OECD Model 
[...]”. As the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal explained, 
the statutory objective:
is to prevent the avoidance of tax resulting from price distortions 
which can arise in the context of non arm’ s length relationships 
by reason of the community of interest shared by related par-
ties. The elimination of these distortions by reference to objective 
benchmarks is all that is required to achieve the statutory objec-
tive. Otherwise all the factors which an arm’ s length person in the 
same circumstances as the respondent would consider relevant 
should be taken into account.243
The text of sections 69(2) and 247(2) of the Canadian 
Income Tax Act is set out in Appendix 3 of this article.
9.1.2.2.  The OECD Guidelines: Coordinated guidance for 
applying the standard
The UN Manual goes on to explain that “Article 9 (‘Associ-
ated Enterprises’) […] advises the application of the arm’ s 
length principle but does not go into the particulars of 
transfer pricing rules”.244 Similarly, the arm’ s length stan-
dard under domestic law may not provide such informa-
tion.245 Further guidance on the application of the standard 
is therefore required. For this purpose, in the United States 
the analysis is carried out in accordance with the guide-
lines that are set out in the US Regulations under section 
482.246 As for other countries, by and large they follow the 
OECD Guidelines,247 as well as domestic administrative 
guidance issued by tax authorities. Notably, attempts are 
made to coordinate the approaches taken by the US Regu-
lations and the OECD Guidelines.248
240. UN, Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, United Nations Practical Manual on 
Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (2013), at 21.
241. CA: Alberta Printed Circuits Ltd. (2010), para. 149.
242. Ctr. for Tax Policy & Admin., Transfer Pricing Legislation: A Suggested 
Approach (OECD June 2004), at 4.
243. CA: General Electric Capital Canada Inc. (2009), para. 55 (emphasis 
added).
244. UN, Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, supra 
n. 240, at 21, para. 1.7.1.
245. Glaxo (SCC), para. 21.
246. H.L. Quek, Economic Substance in U.S. Transfer Pricing and the Regula-
tion of Taxpayer Behavior, 61 Tax Notes Intl. 4 (24 Jan. 2011), at 311, foot-
note 10 (“Treasury regulations form the primary source for guidance on 
the IRS’ s position regarding the interpretation of the [Internal Revenue 
Code]. The ultimate authority to promulgate regulations is vested in the 
secretary of the Treasury. See reg. section 601.601(a). See also Mitch-
ell Rogovin and Donald L. Korb, “The Four R’ s Revisited: Regulations, 
Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View From 
Within,” 46 Duq. L. Rev. 323, 326”).
247. However, there is considerable variation in the extent to which countries 
follow the guidelines (OECD, Transfer Pricing Legislation: A Suggested 
Approach, supra n. 242, at 4).
248. C.M. Radaelli, Game Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship: Trans-
fer Pricing and the Search for Coordination in International Tax Policy, 26 
Policy Studies J. 4 (1998), 603, 613-615. In the years following the publi-
cation of Radaelli’ s article, the coordination between the OECD Guide-
lines and the US Regulations has become even closer. Most notably, 
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9.2.  Appendix 2: Step-transaction tests
There are different ways (tests) by which a step-transaction 
analysis could be applied, as exemplified below by con-
trasting the US and Canadian approaches.
In the United States, the courts developed three differ-
ent tests, any of which could be applied. According to the 
US Tax Court in the Superior Trading case, “[t]hese tests, 
in increasing degrees of permissiveness are: The binding 
commitment test, the end-result test, and the interdepen-
dence test”.249 The end-result test “focuses on the parties’ 
subjective intent at the time of structuring the transaction 
[…]. The test examines whether the formally separate 
steps are prearranged components of a composite trans-
action intended from the outset to arrive at a specific end 
result”.250 As for the interdependence test, it:
analyzes whether the intervening steps are so interdependent that 
the legal relations created by one step would have been fruitless 
without completion of the later series of steps. If, however, inter-
mediate steps accomplished valid and independent economic 
or business purposes, courts respect their independent signifi-
cance.251
For an example of how these tests are applied, see the Buyuk 
case as adjudicated by the US Tax Court.252
The Canadian Supreme Court explained that “where 
[…] the Minister assumes that the tax benefit resulted 
from a series of transactions rather than a single trans-
action, it is necessary to determine if there was a series, 
which transactions make up the series, and whether the 
tax benefit resulted from the series”.253 Rather than adopt-
ing the US mutual-interdependence or end-results test,254 
Canada has adopted the English common law “preordi-
nation test” for determining whether there exists a “series 
of transactions”.255 Where a statutory provision applies to 
a series of transactions, such as transactions affected by 
Canada’ s GAAR in section 245 of the Income Tax Act, 
it is also the English common law approach that applies, 
although this is subject to section 248(10). Section 248(10) 
the 2010 version of the OECD Guidelines applied a “most appropri-
ate method” principle which is similar to the “best method rule” under 
the 1994 US Regulations. Also, the OECD abandoned its prior focus on 
comparing prices, and shifted the focus instead to comparing the arm’ s 
length “outcome”, which is similar to the US approach of comparing the 
arm’ s “result”. Consequently, now both the US Regulations and the OECD 
Guidelines do not impose any strict priority of transfer pricing methods, 
so long as the method used provides the most reliable indication of the 
arm’ s length result/outcome.
249. US: Superior Trading, at 88.
250. Id., at 89.
251. Id., at 90 (internal citations omitted).
252. US: TC, 6 Nov. 2013, Buyuk LLC v. Commissioner, TC Memo, 2013-253, 
at 25-26.
253. CA: Copthorne Holdings Ltd. (2011), para. 40.
254. CA: OSFC Holdings Ltd. (2001), paras. 19-24.
255. The test is derived from the first factor in the four prong test which was 
set out in Furniss v. Dawson (UK: HL, 9 Feb. 1983 (1983) UKHL 4) and 
adopted in Craven v. White (1989). In Craven, Lord Oliver restated these 
factors as follows: “(1) that the series of transactions was, at the time when 
the intermediate transaction was entered into, pre-ordained in order to 
produce a given result; (2) that that transaction had no other purpose 
than tax mitigation; (3) that there was at that time no practical likelihood 
that the preplanned events would not take place in the order ordained, so 
that the intermediate transaction was not even contemplated practically 
as having an independent life, and (4) that the pre-ordained events did 
in fact take place” (supra n. 177, at 514).
has broadened the common law definition of a series by 
“providing that ‘related transactions’ completed ‘in con-
templation of’ or because of the series shall be deemed 
to form part of the series”.256 As the Canadian Tax Court 
recently pointed out, “the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Copthorne Holdings Ltd. [...] mandates an expansive 
approach to the issue of series, given the inclusive nature 
of the meaning to be given to ‘series of transactions’ in sub-
section 248(10)”.257
9.3.  Appendix 3: Extracts of sources of law
9.3.1.  Article 9(1) of the OECD Model
Where
a)  an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or 
indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enter-
prise of the other Contracting State, or
b)  the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the man-
agement, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting 
State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State,
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the 
two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which 
differ from those which would be made between independent en-
terprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, 
have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those 
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of 
that enterprise and taxed accordingly [emphasis added].
9.3.2.  Section 69(2) of the Canadian Income Tax Act
Where a taxpayer has paid or agreed to pay to a non-resident 
person with whom the taxpayer was not dealing at arm’ s length 
as price, rental, royalty or other payment for or for the use or 
reproduction of any property, or as consideration for the carriage 
of goods or passengers or for other services, an amount greater 
than the amount (in this subsection referred to as ‘the reasonable 
amount’) that would have been reasonable in the circumstances 
if the non-resident person and the taxpayer had been dealing 
at arm’ s length, the reasonable amount shall, for the purpose of 
computing the taxpayer’ s income under this Part, be deemed to 
have been the amount that was paid or is payable therefor.
9.3.3.  Section 247(2) of the Canadian Income Tax Act
Transfer pricing adjustment
Where a taxpayer or a partnership and a non-resident person 
with whom the taxpayer or the partnership, or a member of the 
partnership, does not deal at arm’ s length (or a partnership of 
which the non-resident person is a member) are participants in 
a transaction or a series of transactions and
(a)  the terms or conditions made or imposed, in respect of the 
transaction or series, between any of the participants in the 
transaction or series differ from those that would have been 
made between persons dealing at arm’ s length, or
(b)  the transaction or series
 (i)  would not have been entered into between persons dealing 
at arm’ s length, and
 (ii)  can reasonably be considered not to have been entered 
into primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain 
a tax benefit,
any amounts that, but for this section and section 245, would 
be determined for the purposes of this Act in respect of the tax-
payer or the partnership for a taxation year or fiscal period shall 
be adjusted (in this section referred to as an “adjustment”) to the 
256. CA: TC, 2 Oct. 2013, Pièces Automobiles Lecavalier Inc. v. The Queen, 2013 
TCC 310, para. 29.
257. CA: McKesson Canada Corp. (2013), para. 122. See also CA: Copthorne 
Holdings Ltd. (2011), para. 43.
Exported / Printed on 10 Feb. 2017 by IBFD.
199© IBFD INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING JOURNAL MAY/JUNE 2016
Delineating the Terms of a Single Composite Transaction in Transfer Pricing: The Role of Step-Transaction Analysis in the Aggregation 
of Interrelated (Linked) Contracts
quantum or nature of the amounts that would have been deter-
mined if,
(c)  where only paragraph 247(2)(a) applies, the terms and condi-
tions made or imposed, in respect of the transaction or series, 
between the participants in the transaction or series had been 
those that would have been made between persons dealing at 
arm’ s length, or
(d)  where paragraph 247(2)(b) applies, the transaction or series 
entered into between the participants had been the trans-
action or series that would have been entered into between 
persons dealing at arm’ s length, under terms and conditions 
that would have been made between persons dealing at arm’ s 
length.258
258. Emphasis added. 
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